

VILLARREAL HUTNER PC LARA VILLARREAL HUTNER, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 178639 E-Mail: lhutner@vhattorneys.com LAUREN M. COOPER, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 254580 E-Mail: lcooper@vhattorneys.com TIMOTHY L. REED, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 258034 E-Mail: treed@vhattorneys.com 575 Market Street, Suite 1700 San Francisco, California 94105 ALAMEDA COUNTY Telephone: 415.543.4200 Facsimile: 415.512.7674 NOV 2 7 2017 CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, INC. CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 08082399 E-Mail: chris@whelanlawoffices.com 11246 Gold Express Drive, Suite 100 Gold River, California 95670 Telephone: 916.635.5577 Facsimile: 916.635.9159 11 Attorneys for Plaintiff QIQIUIA YOUNG 12 13 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 14 COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 15 RENE C. DAVIDSON COURTHOUSE 16 QIQIUIA YOUNG, 17 Case No. RG17877051 18 Plaintiff, **PROOF OF SERVICE** 19 v. [Assigned For All Purposes To Hon. Ronni MacLaren, Department 25] 20 THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY, STANFORD HEALTH CARE, STANFORD HOSPITAL AND Action Filed: September 28, 2017 CLINICS, CHANRATH FLORES and DOES FAC Filed: October 10, 2017 1 through 50, inclusive, 22 Trial Date: None set 23 Defendants. 24 25 26 27 28

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County of San Francisco, State of California. My business address is 575 Market Street, Suite 1700, San Francisco, CA 94105.

On November 27, 2017, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as

PLAINTIFF QIQIUIA YOUNG'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STANFORD HEALTH CARE'S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF QIQIUIA YOUNG'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STANFORD HEALTH CARE'S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND FOR SANCTIONS

PLAINTIFF QIQIUIA YOUNG'S OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY DEFENDANT STANFORD HEALTH CARE ON ITS MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

DECLARATION OF LARA VILLARREAL HUTNER IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF QIQIUIA YOUNG'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STANFORD HEALTH CARE'S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND FURTHER IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS

DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF QIQIUIA YOUNG IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

DECLARATION OF SHANIQUA GEEGAN

DECLARATION OF SALMA MORALES

DECLARATION OF NEELAM SHARMA

[PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT STANFORD HEALTH CARE, INC.'S MOTION TO TRANSFER FOR AND FOR SANCTIONS AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS

on the interested parties in this action as follows:

SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

BY UPS: I enclosed said document(s) in an envelope or package provided by UPS and addressed to the persons at the addresses listed in the Service List. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of UPS or delivered such document(s) to a courier or driver authorized by UPS to receive documents.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

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SERVICE LIST Qiqiuia Young v. The Leland Stanford Junior University, et al. Case No. RG17877051

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Attorneys for Defendant Stanford Health Care

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1	The motion of defendant Stanford Health Care, Inc. ("Defendant") to transfer the venue
2	in this matter to the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara, as well as for the
3	imposition of monetary sanctions against plaintiff Qiqiuia Young's ("Plaintiff") counsel came on
4	regularly for hearing on December 8, 2017, at 9:00 a.m., in Department 25 of the Superior Court
5	of California, County of Alameda, which is located at the Rene C. Davidson Courthouse, 1225
6	Fallon Street, Oakland, CA 94612. Plaintiff appeared by counsel of Lara Villarreal Hutner.
7	Defendant appeared by counsel of
8	Having read and considered the motion, supporting papers, opposition, and having
9	considered the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing therefore, the Court finds:
10	Defendant's motions is DENIED on the grounds that the Superior Court of California,
11	County of Alameda is [a proper venue for the instant action] [and] [promotes the convenience of
12	the witnesses and the ends of justice].
13	Further, Plaintiff's request for reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees incurred in
14	resisting Defendant's motion to transfer is GRANTED. IT HIS HEREBY ORDERED that
15	Defendant or its counsel pay forthwith the amount of \$23,250.00 on or before
16	, 2017.
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18	IT IS SO ORDERED.
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20	Date:, 2017
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22	TI D D T
23	Hon. Ronni B. MacLaren JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
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46873 2 Case No. RG178779 [PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT STANFORD HEALTH CARE, INC.'S MOTION TO TRANSFER FOR AND FOR SANCTIONS AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS



Case No. RG17877051

VILLARREAL HUTNER PC LARA VILLARREAL HUTNER, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 178639 E-Mail: lhutner@vhattorneys.com LAUREN M. COOPER, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 254580 E-Mail: lcooper@vhattorneys.com TIMOTHY L. REED, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 258034 E-Mail: treed@vhattorneys.com 575 Market Street, Suite 1700 ALAMEDA COUNTY San Francisco, California 94105 Telephone: 415.543.4200 NOV 27 2017 Facsimile: 415.512.7674 CLERKAOF THE OUTERAND & COURT CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, INC. CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 080823 E-Mail: chris@whelanlawoffices.com 11246 Gold Express Drive, Suite 100 Gold River, California 95670 Telephone: 916.635.5577 Facsimile: 916.635.9159 11 Attorneys for Plaintiff QIQIUÍA YOUNG 12 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 13 COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 14 RENE C. DAVIDSON COURTHOUSE 15 QIQIUIA YOUNG, Case No. RG17877051 16 Plaintiff, **DECLARATION OF** 17 **NEELAM SHARMA** 18 THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY, STANFORD HEALTH CARE, STANFORD HOSPITAL AND 20 CLINICS, CHANRATH FLORES, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, 21 Defendants. 22 23 24 25 26 27

DECLARATION OF NEELAM SHARMA

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- 1. I am over 18 years of age, and I make this declaration based upon my own personal knowledge. If I were called as a witness, I could and would testify competently to the facts set forth below.
 - 2. I am not a party to this lawsuit.
 - 3. I live in Fremont, California, in Alameda County.
- 4. I am an employee of University HealthCare Alliance, which is an affiliate with Stanford. I work at University HealthCare Alliance at its ValleyCare facility in Pleasanton, California. Pleasanton is in Alameda County.
- 5. On Friday, September 29, 2017, I was at work at ValleyCare in Pleasanton, in Alameda County, when I received an email from Stanford Health Care's President and CEO David Entwistle with the subject line "Message from SHC President and CEO David Entwistle" attaching a letter from the CEO saying that a lawsuit was "filed by a current employee with allegations of racism and patient safety issues that are grossly exaggerated and largely inaccurate." A true and correct copy of the letter I received from Stanford Health Care CEO David Entwistle is attached as Exhibit A.
- I read the email from the CEO while I was at work in Alameda County, and I knew immediately that the email was about Qiqiuia Young, who is a current Stanford Health Care employee. I have worked with Qiqiuia Young for many years and I was truly shocked to get the email from the CEO of Stanford Health Care portraying Qiqiuia Young as dishonest, untruthful, untrustworthy, and a "gold-digger." I was also concerned about how many other people received the email about Qiqiuia Young based on the CEO saying in the email that he "regret[ted] that it was necessary to communicate broadly about any individual SHC employee." In addition, one of my coworkers at University HealthCare Alliance in Pleasanton commented to me about having received the email from the Stanford Health Care CEO about Qiqiuia Young at work as well. As soon as I read the email, and while I was still at work in Pleasanton, I sent a text to Qiqiuia Young telling her to check her work email to see if she also received the email from the CEO, which she had not known about until I told her. The email is on my work computer in Pleasanton, California, County of Alameda.
- 7. When I am called as a witness in this case, it would be much more convenient for me to attend a trial in Oakland, California than in Santa Clara County, California, as I live and work in the East Bay in Fremont, California. The drive from my job in Pleasanton to downtown Oakland only


takes about 30 minutes, which is far less than the drive time from Pleasanton to downtown San Jose, which at times can take over an hour depending on traffic. I also have two children under age 6, a 4 year old son and a 5 year old son who I take care of. My 5 year old son has started kindergarten and needs me to drive him to and from school in Fremont, so it would be very inconvenient me to have to attend trial in Santa Clara County. For these reasons, I would prefer that Ms. Young's case be tried in Oakland when I am called as a witness.

I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Signed this 27th day of November, 2017, at Pleasanton, California.

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Neelam Sharma



Office of the CEO

September 29, 2017



Dear Colleagues,

I am writing in relation to media coverage you may have seen this week regarding a Stanford Health Care employee. I want to ensure that you have the facts about this unfortunate situation.

A lawsuit has been filed by a current employee with allegations of racism and patient safety issues that are grossly exaggerated and largely inaccurate. SHC is fully committed to a diverse, respectful, and inclusive workplace, and not only encourages, but requires, all employees to raise concerns that they believe may affect the patient experience or the workplace.

Contrary to what you may see in the media, SHC has been extremely proactive in addressing the employee's concerns.

- Although the employee filing the suit was shown a photo of another employee covered in a sheet in 2014, all of the employees involved in that incident were terminated by SHC, including those who merely saw the photo and did not report it to management.
- I, and the Dean of the School of Medicine at Stanford, have personally met with Cancer Center leaders and faculty to deliver the broader message that, while SHC did the right thing to terminate all those involved in the 2014 incident, such behavior -- regardless of whether it is

intended as a prank or an act of hate -- will never be tolerated at SHC. I have conveyed, and will continue to convey, that SHC has zero tolerance for conduct that promotes disrespect of another's race, culture, gender or lifestyle, and anyone who learns of any behavior which is offensive, demeaning or hurtful, needs to act on it immediately using the many resources SHC has, including through HR and leadership.

• Finally, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), an independent agency that certifies and accredits health care organizations, has investigated those issues raised by the employee and found that either there was no issue, or that SHC had resolved the issue. No action has ever been taken against SHC for the purported safety issues raised by the employee. SHC is fully dedicated to patient safety and takes aggressive proactive efforts to ensure safe and quality care.

At every turn, SHC has responded proactively and lawfully when this employee raised concerns about her workplace and SHC will vigorously defend this lawsuit. Although the lawsuit also names Stanford University as a defendant, the actions the employee claims happened to her arise from her employment by SHC and do not involve the University.

I regret that it is necessary to communicate broadly about any individual SHC employee; however, the media coverage in relation to this lawsuit requires that our community receive this information.

The essential values represented throughout Stanford Medicine are important to all of us and I appreciate your continued commitment to ensuring they are upheld.

David Entwistle

President & CEO



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- 1. I am over 18 years of age and I make this declaration based upon personal knowledge. If called as a witness, I could and would testify competently to the facts set forth below.
 - 2. I am not a party to this lawsuit.
 - 3. I am not an employee of Stanford University or Stanford Health Care.
 - 4. I work in Fremont, in Alameda County, California, at the Fremont Psychiatric Hospital.
 - 5. I live in Oakland, in Alameda County, California.
- 6. Attending a trial in this case in Alameda County would be convenient for me. Attending a trial in this case in Santa Clara County would be inconvenient for me because I live in Oakland, and I have two children at home, ages 5 and 11, who I care for, and I also care for my mother, who lives in Newark, in Alameda County, who recently had surgery for a clogged artery in the back of her leg, and who I help take to appointments and run her household. Also, my job is such that I work various hours, and sometimes work overnight from 11:00 p.m. to 7:30 a.m., so traveling beyond Alameda County to testify at trial would be inconvenient for me. For the same reasons, if I were to testify at trial and then were recalled for further testimony, it would be far more convenient for me, and I would far more likely be able to promptly return to a courthouse in Alameda County than in Santa Clara County.
- 7. If I am called to testify at the trial in this lawsuit, I will testify that I worked through a temporary agency as a Medical Assistant at Stanford Health Care from about April 2017 until about the end of July 2017. During that time, I worked with Qiqiuia Young and I witnessed Chanrath Flores, who I knew as "Shawna," repeatedly smashing chairs into Ms. Young. I also will testify to the professional way I witnessed Ms. Young report incidents about Shawna, and I will testify that Martha Berrier's and Ruth Hicks's response to Ms. Young's reports was to brush them under the rug and retaliate against Ms. Young by acting like it was Ms. Young who had done something wrong. I also will testify that Ms. Young was always top notch and a team player who would take initiative and take the lead on things, even when they were not her responsibility, and that she would stop whatever she was doing to help a patient, even if the patient was from another department. I will testify that when

Ms. Young told me that management said in her evaluation that she needed to work on being a team player, I was shocked because Ms. Young was nothing but a team player.

I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Shaniqua Geegan



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I, Salma Morales, declare:

- 1. I am over 18 years of age, and I make this declaration based on my own personal knowledge. If I am called as a witness, I could and would testify competently to the facts set forth below.
 - 2. I am not a party in this lawsuit.
- 3. I live in Fremont, California, in Alameda County and I work as a Medical Assistant for Stanford Health Care.
- 4. If I am called as a witness in this lawsuit, I will testify that I witnessed Qiqiuia Young checking for expiration dates on supplies, including medication, during same the time period that she was given a disciplinary write-up for supposedly not checking for expiration dates on supplies.
- 5. When I started working at Stanford as a Medical Assistant, I was trained on how to check the crash cart and on how to fill out the Ever Ready Checklist. If I am called as a witness, I will testify that during the time that Ms. Young worked in the Palo Alto Cancer Center, the other Medical Assistants were not being trained on how to properly check the crash cart in the Cancer Center and were not checking the crash cart properly. I will also testify that the other Medical Assistants were filing out the Ever Ready Checklists with inaccurate information, basically saying things on the crash cart had been checked when they had not.
- 6. It would be much more convenient for me to attend a trial of Ms. Young's case in Oakland, California than in Santa Clara County, because my family and I live in Alameda County. Although I work in Palo Alto, I prefer not to drive, and so take Stanford's shuttle to work. If the trial were in Oakland, California, I would be able to take BART to and from trial. It would be very inconvenient for me to have to drive to Santa Clara County to attend trial in this case.

I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Signed this **25**day of November, 2017 at Fremont, California

Salma Morales



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I, Qiqiuia Young, declare:

- 1. I am the plaintiff in this lawsuit against Stanford University, Stanford Health Care, Stanford Hospitals and Clinics, and Chanrath Flores. In this declaration, I refer to Stanford University, Stanford Health Care, and Stanford Hospitals and Clinics collectively as "Stanford" or "Stanford Health Care." I am over 18 years of age and I make this declaration based upon my own personal knowledge. If called as a witness, I could and would testify competently to the facts set forth below.
- 2. I live in Fremont, California, which is in Alameda County and I am employed by Stanford Health Care. I have reviewed the Complaint in this action filed on my behalf, and I have and keep records regarding all of my claims in this lawsuit, including my claims of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, at my home in Alameda County, including photographs, emails, my personal notes, and my personnel records.
- 3. In my lawsuit against Stanford and Chanrath Flores, I have brought claims for having been forced to work without pay while at home in Alameda County, and for not being reimbursed for use of my personal cell while working from home. My cell phone is registered to me in Alameda County, and I receive my cell phone bills at my home in Alameda County.
- 4. I also have brought claims based on Chanrath Flores' assault and battery of me. Ms. Flores also is a Stanford Health Care employee, and my claims against her are based in part on an incident at the New Park Mall, Newark, California, in Alameda County, in Spring 2017 when Ms. Flores was threatening to me while I was alone with my then-2-year-old son at the Victoria's Secret in New Park Mall. I believe that Ms. Flores lives in Fremont, California, as on November 12, 2017, I saw her at Lucky's grocery store in Fremont, California, while I was there with my husband.
- 5. In my lawsuit, I have also brought claims for unlawful race discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, as well as discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on my association with the African-American female surgeon referred to in the Complaint as the "Stanford Cancer Surgeon." The person referred to in the Complaint as the "Stanford Cancer Surgeon" is Dr. Kim Rhoads. Dr. Rhoads is a key witness in this lawsuit with respect to my claims for race discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, as well as for my claims for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on my association with her, and my reports of patient safety violations (at times made to Stanford management and regulatory agencies through Dr. Rhoads), as well as Stanford's cover-up and

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retaliation against me in response to the same. I expect that Dr. Rhoads will provide testimony that supports my claims against Stanford for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.

- 6. Dr. Rhoads was the head of the Pelvic Floor Clinic at Stanford when I first started working at Stanford Health Care, and until last year, and she was one of the first people I confided in when my co-workers dressed up like the KKK and took photographs to intimidate me. The primary person who was involved in the KKK incident was Natalie Burazon who was the Patient Testing Technician in Dr. Rhoads' Pelvic Floor Clinic before she was terminated. Dr. Rhoads supported me with Stanford management when I made the report about my co-workers dressing like the KKK and she went to bat for me when I applied to be promoted to be the Pelvic Floor Patient Testing Technician III after Ms. Burazon was terminated. I confided in Dr. Rhoads that after I reported the KKK incident, suddenly management was questioning my work ethic and I kept being passed up for promotion to the Pelvic Floor Patient Testing Technician III position. This was despite the fact that Dr. Rhoads, as the head of the Pelvic Floor Clinic, was recommending me for promotion to the Pelvic Floor Patient Testing Technician III position, and Dr. Rhoads needed someone to fill the vacancy so that she could continue testing patients. After months passed and I was continually passed up for promotion – and Dr. Rhoads was unable to figure out why I was being passed up for promotion when she was recommending me – it was Dr. Rhoads who told me that I needed to find a lawyer to protect myself. Dr. Rhoads helped me find an attorney because I had a baby and I was overwhelmed by being a new mother and by the harassment, discrimination, and retaliation I was suffering at work. Dr. Rhoads came with me to interview the first attorney, and then put me in touch with a second attorney, and ultimately found my attorney for me. Dr. Rhoads also was impacted by the KKK incident because her Pelvic Floor Clinic was basically closed after Stanford fired the people involved in the KKK incident. Dr. Rhoads, who is African-American, was upset that my co-workers had dressed like the KKK at work to intimidate me, and Dr. Rhoads spoke out often about the fact that there was no anti-harassment training done after it happened. After Dr. Rhoads started speaking out on my behalf, I witnessed that she started being treated like a second-class citizen at Stanford such that she did not get the same support that the other surgeons did who I worked with.
- 7. In early 2016, Dr. Rhoads told me that she spoke for hours to an investigator who Stanford had hired named Terry Roemer about race discrimination and retaliation at Stanford. She

gave the investigator documents and told the investigator that she should talk to me as a witness. The investigator <u>never</u> contacted me. After meeting with the investigator, Dr. Rhoads told me that she had recorded the whole interview with the investigator, and had it transcribed. As a member of Dr. Rhoads' Pelvic Floor Clinic, I have knowledge that Dr. Rhoads was not at work during this period of time. As a result, I presume that Dr. Rhoads had (and has) the transcript of the recording that references me and the KKK incident at her home.

- 8. Dr. Rhoads told me many times that she lives in Oakland, California, Alameda County. I am informed and believe that Dr. Rhoads has documents, including electronically stored documents, at her home on her home computer that show Stanford discriminated against, retaliated against, and harassed me. I believe that these documents include the transcription of Dr. Rhoads' interview with Stanford's investigator, Terry Roemer, as well as original emails about me and my discrimination, retaliation, and harassment claims that Dr. Rhoads sent to Stanford management, and then forwarded to me after she sent them to Stanford's management. I also believe Dr. Rhoads also has the original email in response to the patient safety issue she reported on my behalf from Stanford Health Care's Patient Safety Consultant in the Quality, Patient Safety and Effectiveness Department that is photographed in my Complaint admitting that safety reports "have been used punitively" by Stanford Health Care.
- 9. Dr. Rhoads also reported to Stanford management, and later to the Joint Commission, the patient safety concerns that I brought to her attention because I was afraid to report them myself for fear of retaliation. One of these concerns was that the other Medical Assistants did not know how to properly check the Cancer Center's "crash cart" which we would use to resuscitate patients who went into cardiac arrest or who had other life-threatening problems but they would fill out the forms required for regulatory compliance (called the Ever-Ready checklists) saying they had checked the "crash cart" properly. In fact, they had not and it was not properly maintained or equipped such that essential lifesaving supplies were not in stock and available contrary to false record keeping. Before Dr. Rhoads reported my concern about the "crash cart" and the Every-Ready checklists being filled out falsely, I made hard copies of the records of the Ever-Ready checklists and gave them to Dr. Rhoads for safe-keeping away from work, so she could keep them at her home. After Dr. Rhoads reported my patient safety concerns to Stanford management, the retaliation against me by

management escalated. It was around the same time that I received an email from Dr. Rhoads saying that she had resigned.

- Director of Stanford's Cancer Center. In addition to me reporting the KKK incident, Ms. DePorte will testify to the Cancer Center procedures and protocols relating to the work environment, patient safety issues, employee training, and the Cancer Center "crash cart" not being properly checked or maintained after her tenure as Director of the Cancer Center ended. My understanding is that Ms. DePorte is no longer a Stanford employee and she lives in Alameda County. I based my information about where Ms. DePorte lives on the fact that she and I go to the same manicurist at Nail Chic, located at 5932 Newpark Mall Road, in Newark, California, Alameda County, and I have seen her there and I have talked to my manicurist about the fact that Ms. Deporte is her client, too. I anticipate that Ms. DePorte will offer testimony that is helpful to my case against Stanford regarding the KKK incident and Stanford's policies, procedures, and protocols..
- 11. Estedar Gizaw is a nurse of Ethiopian descent and is Dr. Brendan Visser's nurse. Ms. Gizaw is a witness to Dr. Brendan Visser's statement to an African doctor asking whether her boyfriend eats "bushmeat" and to Dr. Visser's harassment and mistreatment of me after I reported my co-workers dressing like the KKK to intimidate me. I believe that Ms. Gizaw lives in Alameda County because she told me she lives near Dr. Rhoads, who lives in Oakland, and because, when I was looking at a wedding site at Lake Temescal, in Temescal, Alameda County, I showed the site to Ms. Gizaw, and Ms. Gizaw responded by telling me that she could walk to Lake Temescal from her house. Ms. Gizaw's testimony in this case will be supportive of my claims that Stanford treated me unlawfully based on my race and in retaliation for making complaints of racism and patient endangerment. Ms. Gizaw's testimony in this case also will be supportive of my claims that there is a culture of race harassment, discrimination, and retaliation at Stanford.
- 12. Odalicia Benavidez is a witness in this case, as she is one of the Stanford Health Care employees who I reported for using the "N" word at work, and her testimony regarding my reporting of use of the "N" word at Stanford will support my case. Based on information I have received and my belief based on such information, Ms. Benavidez lives in Hayward, California, Alameda County.

- Ms. Paulin has information that, after I reported Eduardo Sudano for using the "N" word at work, he was promised a promotion and pay raise when he returned to the Cancer Center. Ms. Paulin's testimony will be favorable to me and support my claims that Stanford engaged in unlawful conduct toward me. Based on information that I have received and my belief based on such information, Ms. Paulin lives in Union City, California, Alameda County.
- 14. Winnie Suguitan is a Stanford Health Care employee and a witness in this case. Ms. Suguitan has information about the retaliation I have suffered by Stanford Health Care's Assistant Director Martha Berrier regarding adverse changes to my work schedule. Based on information that I have received and my belief based on such information, Ms. Suguitan lives in Hayward, California, Alameda County. Ms. Suguitan's testimony will support my retaliation claim against Stanford.
- 15. Leah Lillard is a Stanford Health Care employee and a witness in this case. Ms. Lillard is a witness to Chanrath Flores' retaliation and harassment of me and will offer testimony that supports these claims. Based on information that I have received and my belief based on such information, Ms. Lillard lives in Oakland, California, Alameda County.
- 16. I have worked for Stanford Health Care since June of 2011, and part of my job has been rooming patients for the colorectal surgeons and the oncologists. Working with the colorectal surgeons and oncologists, I can attest that they have scheduled days off.
- 17. On September 29, 2017, in retaliation for my filing this lawsuit alleging, among other things, discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, Stanford Health Care CEO David Entwistle sent an email to the Stanford community basically calling me a liar. In his email, Mr. Entwistle wrote that my allegations of "racism and patient safety issues" were "grossly exaggerated and largely inaccurate."
- 18. I first learned that the CEO of Stanford Health Care had sent his September 29, 2017 email accusing me throughout the Stanford community of being dishonest, of being a liar and of making false complaints to Stanford, to government agencies and of filing a false and baseless lawsuit from Neelam Sharma, who works for University HealthCare Alliance in Pleasanton, California, Alameda County, while she was at work in Pleasanton, in Alameda County. Ms. Sharma texted me while I was at work and told me to check my email because the CEO had sent an email about me. Mr. Entwistle's September 29 email about me is not only stored on Ms. Sharma's computer at her place of

work in Pleasanton, California, but is also likely on the computers of all Stanford Health Care employees in Stanford's Alameda County locations, including its offices in Alameda, Berkeley, Castro Valley, Emeryville, Hayward, Livermore, Oakland, and Pleasanton. As a result of Mr. Entwistle's retaliatory characterization of me as dishonest, I believe I have lost respect and credibility with many Stanford employees, making my job more difficult and any promotion or advancement of my career impossible. A true and correct copy CEO. Entwistle's September 29, 2017 email regarding my lawsuit and my employment with Stanford is attached as **Exhibit A** (to address formatting and printing issues, I have also included a Word version of CEO Entwistle's email that includes the text of the email in its entirety).

- 19. On October 6, 2017, I caused to be filed a Complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") based, in part, on CEO Entwistle's retaliatory email in response to my filing this lawsuit. A true and correct copy of my October 6, 2017 DFEH Complaint is attached as **Exhibit B**.
- 20. As a result of Stanford's discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, I have experienced significant emotional distress, including depression, insomnia, and anxiety. I have seen two medical providers for treatment for my emotional distress, and they will testify at trial in support of my allegations that I have been injured emotional as a result of Stanford's actions. Their practices and their records reflecting my emotional distress and treatment are in Alameda County. I have sought treatment to address my emotional injuries at the offices of Varnita Marsh & Associates, which is located in Oakland, California, and I have been treated for my emotional injuries by Dr. Jinghua Shi and Dr. Adrienne Difabio at Kaiser in Fremont, California.
- 21. My family members have also witnessed the emotional toll that Stanford's discrimination, harassment, and retaliation have taken on me, as well as the wrongful conduct of Chanrath Flores. My husband, Ashraf Elsayid, who lives with me in Fremont, California, will likely testify at trial regarding my emotional injuries. In addition, my mother Madeline Young, who lives in Fremont, California, may also provide testimony about my depression, anxiety, and insomnia resulting from Stanford's discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, as well as the wrongful conduct of Chanrath Flores. My mother has recently had a hip replacement and cannot drive. As a result, it would be difficult for her to travel to San Jose, California or elsewhere in Santa Clara County for trial.

Oakland would be the most convenient location for her to attend trial, as she can travel to and from trial by BART.

Alameda Superior Court is my preferred venue for my lawsuit, but it is not just because some of my claims happened in Alameda County, or because many records important to my case, including my claims of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, are maintained in Alameda County, or for the convenience of many of the witnesses who will provide testimony to support my claims and who live in Alameda County, but also because I am afraid that after the CEO sent out that retaliatory email essentially telling all Stanford employees that I am untruthful and a liar, these false accusations did not stop there, and in all likelihood spread to the families and friends of all the recipients of that hateful personal attack on me. I am convinced that I cannot get a fair trial in Santa Clara County because Stanford is one of the largest employers in Santa Clara County and so thousands of Stanford employees, their families and friends, have been poisoned to think that I am dishonest and a liar by one of the most powerful people in that County. I am also afraid that if I am unable to get a fair trial, the patients whose safety I worry about will continue to be unprotected.

I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Signed this 26th day of November, 2017, at Fremont, California.

Qiqinia Young



From: Message from SHC President and CEO David Entwistle

[mailto:<u>shcexecutiveoffices@stanfordhealthcare.org</u>] **Sent:** Friday, September 29, 2017 12:20 PM

To: Young, Qiqiuia

Subject: An important message from SHC CEO David Entwistle

Office of the CEO

September 29, 2017



Dear Colleagues,

I am writing in relation to media coverage you may have seen this week regarding a Stanford Health Care employee. I want to ensure that you have the facts about this unfortunate situation.

A lawsuit has been filed by a current employee with allegations of racism and patient safety issues that are grossly exaggerated and largely inaccurate. SHC is fully committed to a diverse, respectful, and inclusive workplace, and not only encourages, but requires, all employees to raise concerns that they believe may affect the patient experience or the workplace.

Contrary to what you may see in the media, SHC has been extremely proactive in addressing the employee's concerns.

- Although the employee filing the suit was shown a photo of another employee covered in a sheet in 2014, all of the employees involved in that incident were terminated by SHC, including those who merely saw the photo and did not report it to management.
- I, and the Dean of the School of Medicine at Stanford, have personally met with Cancer Center leaders and faculty to deliver the broader message that, while SHC did the right thing to terminate all those involved in the 2014 incident, such behavior -- regardless of whether it is intended as a prank or an act of hate -- will never be tolerated at SHC. I have conveyed, and will continue to convey, that SHC has zero tolerance for conduct that promotes disrespect of another's race, culture, gender or lifestyle, and anyone who learns of any behavior which is offensive, demeaning or hurtful, needs to act on it immediately using the many resources SHC has, including through HR and

Stanford Health Care, <u>300 Pasteur Drive</u>, <u>Stanford</u>, CA <u>94305</u> <u>SafeUnsubscribe™ qyoung@stanfordhealthcare.org</u>

Forward this email | About our service provider

Sent by shcexecutiveoffices@stanfordhealthcare.org

Office of the CEO

September 29, 2017



Dear Colleagues,

I am writing in relation to media coverage you may have seen this week regarding a Stanford Health Care employee. I want to ensure that you have the facts about this unfortunate situation.

A lawsuit has been filed by a current employee with allegations of racism and patient safety issues that are grossly exaggerated and largely inaccurate. SHC is fully committed to a diverse, respectful, and inclusive workplace, and not only encourages, but requires, all employees to raise concerns that they believe may affect the patient experience or the workplace.

Contrary to what you may see in the media, SHC has been extremely proactive in addressing the employee's concerns.

- Although the employee filing the suit was shown a photo of another employee covered in a sheet in 2014, all of the employees involved in that incident were terminated by SHC, including those who merely saw the photo and did not report it to management.
- I, and the Dean of the School of Medicine at Stanford, have personally met with Cancer Center leaders and faculty to deliver the broader message that, while SHC did the right thing to terminate all those involved in the 2014 incident, such behavior -- regardless of whether it is

intended as a prank or an act of hate -- will never be tolerated at SHC. I have conveyed, and will continue to convey, that SHC has zero tolerance for conduct that promotes disrespect of another's race, culture, gender or lifestyle, and anyone who learns of any behavior which is offensive, demeaning or hurtful, needs to act on it immediately using the many resources SHC has, including through HR and leadership.

Finally, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), an
independent agency that certifies and accredits health care organizations, has investigated
those issues raised by the employee and found that either there was no issue, or that SHC had
resolved the issue. No action has ever been taken against SHC for the purported safety issues
raised by the employee. SHC is fully dedicated to patient safety and takes aggressive proactive
efforts to ensure safe and quality care.

At every turn, SHC has responded proactively and lawfully when this employee raised concerns about her workplace and SHC will vigorously defend this lawsuit. Although the lawsuit also names Stanford University as a defendant, the actions the employee claims happened to her arise from her employment by SHC and do not involve the University.

I regret that it is necessary to communicate broadly about any individual SHC employee; however, the media coverage in relation to this lawsuit requires that our community receive this information.

The essential values represented throughout Stanford Medicine are important to all of us and I appreciate your continued commitment to ensuring they are upheld.

David Entwistle

President & CEO

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COMPLAINT OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

BEFORE THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING Under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.)

DFEH No. 807948-311184

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In the Matter of the Complaint of Qiqiuia Young, Complainant.

7 4973 Central Avenue, Apt. 246

Fremont, California 94536

vs.

Office Of The General Counsel The Leland Stanford Junior University, Respondent. Stanford University Building 170, 3rd Floor, Main Quad

Stanford, California 94305

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Complainant alleges:

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1. Respondent **The Leland Stanford Junior University** is a **Private College/University** subject to suit under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). Complainant believes respondent is subject to the FEHA.

2. On or around October 02, 2017, complainant alleges that respondent took the following adverse actions against complainant: Discrimination, Harassment, Retaliation Denied a work environment free of discrimination and/or retaliation, Other, On September 28, 2017, Ms. Young filed a lawsuit against The Leland Stanford Jr. University (also referred to as Stanford University), Stanford Health Care, Stanford Hospital and Clinics, and Chanrath Flores alleging claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") for discrimination and harassment based on race, retaliation based on making complaints of discrimination and harassment based on race, including, but not limited to claims arising from her co-workers dressing like the KKK to intimidate and harass her, as well as for discrimination and retaliation based on her association with Stanford Cancer Surgeons who engaged in the protected activity of reporting race discrimination and harassment, including Stanford staff dressing like the KKK, as well as patient

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endangerment and Stanford staff secretly photographing patient genitals, and for failure to investigate Ms. Young's reports of race harassment, discrimination, and retaliation.

The day following the filing of the civil complaint, on September 29, 2017, in retaliation for filing the lawsuit asserting, among other things, the above listed claims for race harassment, discrimination and retaliation under the FEHA stemming from Stanford staff dressing like the KKK to intimidate and harass Ms. Young and the ongoing and continued retaliation of her for reporting the same, President and Chief Executive Officer of Stanford Health Care David Entwistle published a statement to all employees of Stanford Health Care and. on information and belief, to employees of Stanford University, including all of the co-workers, supervisors, and employee and labor relations personnel connected to Ms. Young publicly retaliating against Ms. Young for exercising her rights by publicly humiliating and threatening her, as well as violating her right to privacy provided by the California Constitution and as promised in all employee handbooks. Codes of Conduct. Administrative Policies and Rules. President and CEO David Entwistle did this by unlawfully disclosing Ms. Young's personnel information, the results of the confidential investigation into her report of co-workers dressing like the KKK to intimidate and harass her, as well as other investigations into Ms. Young's reports of harassment, discrimination and retaliation, and by portraying Ms. Young - a current employee - as a traitor and a liar who he intends to vigorously fight. Ms. Young first heard that the President and CEO sent an email retaliating against her for having exercised her rights from a co-worker who received the retaliatory email while she was at work at Stanford Health Care's Pleasanton, California location in Alameda County.

Clearly this unprovoked, unjustified, and unlawful bullying through public humiliation and personal attacks on the truthfulness, integrity, honesty, purpose and morality of Ms. Young by President and CEO Entwistle, the most powerful person at Stanford Health Care, was in retaliation for the brave and principled efforts of Ms. Young to stop racial harassment, discrimination and retaliation in her workplace. The fully authorized and ratified actions of CEO Entwistle were for the sole purpose of retaliation, humiliation, punishment, and intimidation of Ms. Young.

On information and belief, the Stanford Health Care President and CEO's sending of the unlawful and maligning retaliatory email against Ms. Young was authorized and ratified by The Leland Stanford Jr. University's Office of General Counsel, including Debra Zumwalt (General Counsel) and Angeline Covey (Senior Employment Counsel) both of whom represent both The Leland Stanford Jr. University as well Stanford Health Care (as well as Stanford Hospitals and Clinics, before it changed names to Stanford Health Care). Indeed, General Counsel Debra Zumwalt is the agent for service of process

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listed with the California Secretary of State for all three Stanford Defendants in this matter. Complainant believes respondent committed these actions because of their: Association with a member of a protected class, Color, Engagement in Protected Activity, Race, Other filing a lawsuit that includes claims of harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and failure to investigate under the Fair Employment and Housing Act.

3. Complainant **Qiqiuia Young** resides in the City of **Fremont**, State of **California**. If complaint includes co-respondents please see below.

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Date Filed: October 06, 2017

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2	Co-Respondents: Stanford Health Care Office Of The General Counsel Stanford University Building 170, 3rd Floor, Main Quad Stanford California 94305
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6	Stanford Hospital And Clinics Office Of The General Counsel
7	Stanford University Building 170, 3rd Floor, Main Quad
8	Stanford California 94305
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Date Filed: October 06, 2017

Additional Complaint Details:

Retaliation, discrimination, harassment on September 29, 2017 and October 2, 2017, and continuing and ongoing failure to investigate reports of the same.

On information and belief, the President and CEO of Stanford Health Care received explicit approval from The Leland Stanford Jr. University's Office of General Counsel to send his email humiliating and maligning Ms. Young, and invading her right to privacy under the California Constitution and other California statutes protecting her privacy regarding her personnel records and confidential investigations of race discrimination, harassment and retaliation and reports of patient safety issues and concerns all in retaliation for her opposing discrimination, harassment and retaliation and filing a lawsuit asserting claims of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and failure to investigate and correct the same under the FEHA. Ms. Young will amend this Charge as others who ratified the President and CEO's retaliatory conduct as they become known to her through discovery.

On information and belief, faculty who are employed by Stanford University also received the Stanford Health Care`s President and CEO`s retaliatory email unlawfully disclosing Ms. Young`s private personnel information and further maligning her integrity, honesty, purpose and morality by calling her a liar. Stanford Health Care CEO Entwistles authorized and ratified retaliatory message was clear and, as reported to Ms. Young by Stanford University faculty who received the email, the CEO put a hit out on Ms. Young so that people can do whatever they want to her.

On information and belief, on or before October 2, 2017, one or more faculty members employed by The Leland Stanford Jr. University made a complaint of retaliation to management, including, on information and belief, to The Leland Stanford Jr. University's Office of General Counsel, on Ms. Young's behalf based on Stanford Health Care President and CEO David Entwistle's retaliatory and unlawful September 29, 2017 email intimidating, threatening, and maligning Ms. Young.

On October 2, 2017, as further retaliation for having filed her lawsuit asserting claims under the FEHA, and as discrimination and retaliation against Ms. Young as a result of her association with Stanford University's faculty members who complained of the CEO's unlawful, threatening, and retaliatory email to The Leland Stanford Jr. University's Office of General Counsel on Ms. Youngs behalf, Ms. Young was informed by management that she was going to be moved to work with those named in her lawsuit as having battered, assaulted, and intimidated her. In response to receiving this notice, Ms. Young reported to management retaliation by Stanford Health Care's President and CEO David Entwistle as well as management's retaliatory intimidation

Date Filed: October 06, 2017

and bullying of her by moving her to work with those she named in her lawsuit as having battered, assaulted, and intimidated her.

No investigation into Ms. Young's report of the Stanford Health Care President and CEO's unlawful, retaliatory, threatening, intimidating, harassing, and maligning email about Ms. Young was conducted, further underscoring that the retaliatory email had been sent with the authorization, ratification and approval of The Leland Stanford Jr. University's Office of General Counsel.

Moreover, no investigation into Ms. Young's report of the retaliatory nature of management's decision to suddenly move Ms. Young to work with those named in her lawsuit as having battered, assaulted, and intimidated her was conducted, underscoring that this decision, too, had been made with the ratification and approval of The Leland Stanford Jr. University's Office of General Counsel.

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VERIFICATION

I, Lara Villarreal Hutner, am the Attorney for Complainant in the above-entitled complaint. I have read the foregoing complaint and know the contents thereof. The same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe it to be true.

On October 06, 2017, I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

San Francisco, California Lara Villarreal Hutner

FEH 902-1



VILLARREAL HUTNER PC LARA VILLARREAL HUTNER, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 178639 E-Mail: lhutner@vhattorneys.com 2 LAUREN M. COOPER, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 254580 3 E-Mail: lcooper@vhattorneys.com TIMOTHY L. REED, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 258034 4 E-Mail: treed@vhattorneys.com 575 Market Street, Suite 1700 5 San Francisco, California 94105 Telephone: 415.543.4200 6 Facsimile: 415.512.7674 7 CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, INC. CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 080823 8 E-Mail: chris@whelanlawoffices.com 11246 Gold Express Drive, Suite 100 9 Gold River, California 95670 Telephone: 916.635.5577 10 Facsimile: 916.635.9159 11 Attorneys for Plaintiff 12 **QIQIUIA YOUNG** 13 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 14 **COUNTY OF ALAMEDA** 15 RENE C. DAVIDSON COURTHOUSE 16 QIQIUIA YOUNG, Case No. RG17877051 17 Plaintiff, 18 PLAINTIFF QIQIUIA YOUNG'S **OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE** ٧. 19 PROFFERED BY DEFENDANT STANFORD HEALTH CARE ON ITS THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR 20 UNIVERSITY, STANFORD HEALTH MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS CARE, STANFORD HOSPITAL AND 21 CLINICS, CHANRATH FLORES, and DOES Hon. Ronni MacLaren Judge: 22 1 through 50, inclusive, Date: December 8, 2017 23 Time: 9:00 a.m. Defendants. 25 Dept.: 24 Reservation Number: R-1899966 25 26 27 28

Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young ("Plaintiff") respectfully objects to the following evidence proffered by defendant Stanford Health Care in connection with Stanford Health Care's motion to transfer venue and for sanctions.

Objections to Declaration of Pamela Ng

Objection Number 1

"On October 12, 2017, I reviewed a KTVU article regarding the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint < http://www.ktvu.com/news/stanford-health-care-worker-alleges-racism-safety-violations-after-co-worker-dresses-as-kkk. I printed a complete and accurate copy of the KTVU article I reviewed and attached it to this declaration as Exhibit 3." (Ng Decl., ¶ 6, page 2 lines 21 to 24, and Exhibit 3 thereto in its entirety.)

Grounds for Objection 1: Hearsay (Cal. Evid. Code § 1200), and irrelevant (Cal. Evid. Code § 350). Stanford Health Care proffers the article to prove the truth of a matter Stanford Health Care contends is asserted therein, namely, that Plaintiff's attorney "selected the current venue of Alameda County because she believes it is the venue most 'favorable' to her client." (Stanford Health Care's Memo. at 4:9-11, 16:10-13.) Stanford Health Care contends that Plaintiff "stated" this out of court. (*Id.* at 4:9, 16:10-11). As an initial matter, the article does not quote Plaintiff's counsel. Moreover, the article does not identify any *reason* for her purported belief – which renders it irrelevant and immaterial. In addition, the article purports to relay a statement made by Plaintiff's counsel, other than while testifying at the hearing, and Stanford Health Care offers the article to "prove" the truth of the matter supposedly stated. As such it is inadmissible hearsay under California Evidence Code Section 1200.

Further, the article is inadmissible "double hearsay": it is a hearsay statement made by an unidentified KTVU reporter, other than while testifying at the hearing, and Stanford Health Care offers it to prove the truth of the second matter asserted, namely that Plaintiff's counsel made her supposed statement. See People v. Sanchez, 63 Cal.4th 665, 674-75 (2016) ("Documents like letters, reports, and memoranda are often hearsay because they are prepared by a person outside the courtroom and are usually offered to prove the truth of the information they contain. Documents may also contain multiple levels of hearsay. . . . If offered for its truth, the report itself is a hearsay

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statement made by the person who wrote it. Statements of others, related by the report writer, are a second level of hearsay. Multiple hearsay may not be admitted unless there is an exception for each level").

Objections to Declaration of Suzanne Harris

Objection Number 2

"In my position, I have access to employment status records for Stanford Health Care employees. Based upon my review of same, I have determined that the following individuals are currently employed by Stanford Health Care: 1) Qiqiuia Young, Pelvic Health Center, Patient Testing Technician III; 2) Mary Gaines, Office of Employee Labor Relations, Administrative Director; 3) Chanrath Flores, Blake Wilbur Multispecialty Clinic, Clinic Clerical Coordinator; 4) Christina Guijarro, Cancer Center, Assistant Clinical Operations Manager; 5) Sridhar Seshadri, Cancer Center, Administrative Director; 6) Patricia Falconer, Cancer Center, Administrative Director; 7) Martha Berrier, Cancer Center, Assistant Director; 8) David Entwistle, Main Hospital, Chief Executive Officer; 9) Quinn McKenna, Main Hospital, Chief Operating Officer; 10) Linda Hoff, Main Hospital, Chief Financial Officer." (Harris Decl., ¶ 4, page 2 lines 6 to 15.)

Grounds for Objection 2: Inadmissible oral testimony of the contents of an unauthenticated writing (Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1523, 1401).

Dated: November 25, 2017

VILLARREAL HUTNER PC CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, INC.

CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN

Attorneys for Plaintiff **QIQIUIA YOUNG**

VILLARREAL HUTNER PC LARA VILLARREAL HUTNER, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 178639 2 E-Mail: lhutner@vhattorneys.com LAUREN M. COOPER, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 254580 3 E-Mail: lcooper@vhattorneys.com TIMOTHY L. REED, ESO., Cal. Bar No. 258034 4 E-Mail: treed@vhattorneys.com 575 Market Street, Suite 1700 FILED 5 San Francisco, California 94105 ALAMEDA COUNTY Telephone: 415.543.4200 6 Facsimile: 415.512.7674 NOV 27 2017 7 CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, INC. CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 080823 8 E-Mail: chris@whelanlawoffices.com 11246 Gold Express Drive, Suite 100 9 Gold River, California 95670 Telephone: 916.635.5577 10 Facsimile: 916.635.9159 11 Attorneys for Plaintiff 12 QIQIUÍA YOUNG 13 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 14 COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 15 RENE C. DAVIDSON COURTHOUSE 16 QIQIUIA YOUNG, Case No. RG17877051 17 Plaintiff, 18 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF QIQIUIA 19 YOUNG'S OPPOSITION TO **DEFENDANT STANFORD HEALTH** THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR 20 UNIVERSITY, STANFORD HEALTH **CARE'S MOTION TO TRANSFER** CARE, STANFORD HOSPITAL AND **VENUE AND MOTION FOR** 21 CLINICS, CHANRATH FLORES, and DOES SANCTIONS, AND FOR SANCTIONS 22 1 through 50, inclusive, Judge: Hon. Ronni MacLaren 23 Date: December 8, 2017 Defendants. Time: 9:00 a.m. 24 Dept.: 25 25 Reservation Number: R-1899966 26 2.7 28

Pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452 and 453, Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young respectfully requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following records and the relevant fact demonstrated thereby:

- A. Four records described as (1) a Business Search Entity Detail for Stanford Health Care (2) a Certificate of Amendment of Articles of Incorporation filed with the California Secretary of State on October 9, 2014, (3) a Statement of Information filed with the California Secretary of State on February 1, 2016, and (4) a Statement of Information filed with the California Secretary of State on February 1, 2017, all of which are records maintained by the California Secretary of State and which are publicly available on the California Secretary of State's website at https://businesssearch.sos.ca.gov/. A true and correct copy of all of these records is attached hereto as Exhibit A. These records demonstrate that Stanford Health Care is a California corporation.
- B. Records described as "Google search results" dated November 26, 2017 detailing the distance in miles between Palo Alto and Oakland (33.4 miles) and Palo Alto and San Jose (17.4 miles), are publically available online through https://www.google.com/. A true and correct copy of a portion of the records resulting from the Google searches "distance between Palo Alto and Oakland" and "distance between Palo Alto and San Jose" are attached hereto as **Exhibit B**.
- C. A record described as an article in the Silicon Valley Business Journal dated July 19, 2013, titled "Silicon Valley's 10 largest employers who made the list?" publicly-available at the web page https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2013/07/18/the-list-top-100-silicon-valley.html, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as **Exhibit C**. This record demonstrates that as of 2013, Stanford Health Care is the ninth-largest employer in Silicon Valley, with 8,451 full-time employees there; that Stanford University is the sixth-largest employer in Silicon Valley, with 11,442 full-time

employees there; and that combined, they are the largest employer of any kind, public or private, in Silicon Valley (*i.e.*, in Santa Clara County), with nearly 20,000 employees there as of 2013.

Dated: November 26, 2017


VILLARREAL HUTNER PC

CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, INC.

By

LARA VILLARREAL HUTNER CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN

Attorneys for Plaintiff QIQIUIA YOUNG





Q Business Search - Entity Detail

The California Business Search is updated daily and reflects work processed through Sunday, November 19, 2017. Please refer to document Processing Times for the received dates of filings currently being processed. The data provided is not a complete or certified record of an entity. Not all images are available online.

C0336653 STANFORD HEALTH CARE

Registration Date: Jurisdiction:

Entity Type:

Status:

Agent for Service of Process:

Entity Address:

Entity Mailing Address:

04/12/1957 CALIFORNIA

DOMESTIC NONPROFIT

ACTIVE

DEBRA L ZUMWALT

450 SERRA MALL MAIN QUAD BLDG 170 3RD FL

STANFORD CA 94305 300 PASTEUR DR H3200

STANFORD CA 94305

300 PASTEUR DR H3200 STANFORD CA 94305

A Statement of Information is due EVERY ODD-NUMBERED year beginning five months before and through the end of April,

Document Type 1	File Date	PDF
SI-COMPLETE	02/01/2017	The many principal principal principal and a part of the principal and p
SI-COMPLETE	02/01/2016	
AMENDMENT	10/09/2014	The second secon
AMENDMENT .	04/06/2000	Image unavailable. Please request paper copy.
AMENDMENT	01/27/2000	Image unavailable. Please request paper copy.
RESTATED REGISTRATION	11/01/1997	Image unavailable, Please request paper copy.
RESTATED REGISTRATION	08/16/1994	Image unavailable. Please request paper copy.
AMENDMENT	07/02/1968	Image unavailable. Please request paper copy.
AMENDMENT	03/03/1967	Image unavailable. Please request paper copy.
REGISTRATION	04/12/1957	Image unavailable. Please request paper copy.

^{*} Indicates the information is not contained in the California Secretary of State's database.

- If the status of the corporation is "Surrender," the agent for service of process is automatically revoked. Please refer to California Corporations Code section 2114 for information relating to service upon corporations that have surrendered.
- . For information on checking or reserving a name, refer to Name Availability.
- If the image is not available online, for information on ordering a copy refer to Information Requests.
- For information on ordering certificates, status reports, certified copies of documents and copies of documents not currently available in the Business Search or to request a more extensive search for records, refer to Information Requests.
- For help with searching an entity name, refer to **Search Tips**.
- For descriptions of the various fields and status types, refer to <u>Frequently Asked Questions</u>.

Modify Search

New Search

Back to Search Results

hxo

0336653

A0761785

FILED
Secretary of State
State of California

5cc OCT 0 9 2014

Certificate of Amendment of Articles of Incorporation

The undersigned certify that:

- 1. They are the president and the secretary, respectively, of Stanford Hospital and Clinics, a California corporation.
- 2. Article ONE of the Articles of Incorporation of this corporation is amended to read as follows:

The name of this corporation is Stanford Health Care.

- 3. The foregoing amendment of Articles of Incorporation has been duly approved by the board of directors.
- 4. The foregoing amendment of Articles of Incorporation has been duly approved by the required vote of the member.

We further declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the matters set forth in this certificate are true and correct of our own knowledge.

DATE: October 7, 2014

Amir Dan Rubin, President

Carlcen Maniglia, Secretary



SI-100 (REV 01/2016)

State of California Secretary of State

43.

Statement of Information

(Domestic Nonprofit, Credit Union and General Cooperative Corporations)

Filing Fee: \$20.00. If this is an amendment, see instructions.

IMPORTANT – READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING THIS FORM

FILED ecretary of S

APPROVED BY SECRETARY OF STATE

IMPORTANT - READ IN	STRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING	THIS FORM		etary of State of California	
1. CORPORATE NAME					•
STANFORD HEALTH CAR	E		FEI	B 0 1 2016	
•					
			•		
			1 1		
2. CALIFORNIA CORPORATE N	NUMBER C0336653		21 NF PC 2		2/8/1
Complete Principal Office Ad	Idress (Do not abbreviate the name of the city.	Item 3 cannot be a P.O. B		ang osc only	\neg
3. STREET ADDRESS OF PRINCIPA		CITY	STATE	ZIP CODE	
300 Pasteur Drive H3200	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	Stanford	CA	94305	j
4. MAILING ADDRESS OF THE COR	POPATION	CITY	STATE	ZIP CODE	
MAILING ADDRESS OF THE COM	FORATION	OIII	GIAIL	ZIF CODE	
	sses of the Following Officers (The corporate preprinted titles on this form must not be altered		e officers. A compara	ble title for the spe	ecific
5. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERV	ADDRESS	CITY	STATE	ZIP CODE	
Mariann Byerwalter	300 Pasteur Drive H3200	Stanford	CA	94305	ľ
6. SECRETARY	ADDRESS	CITY	STATE	ZIP CODE	
James Hereford/COO	300 Pasteur Drive H3200	Stanford	CA	94305	
7. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER/	ADDRESS	CITY	STATE	ZIP CODE	[
David Connor	1510 Page Mill Road, 2nd Floor	Palo Alto	CA	94304	
address, a P.O. Box address is n	s if the agent is an individual, the agent must not acceptable. If the agent is another corporation provided in the section 1505 and Item 9 must be provided in the section	ion, the agent must have o			
 NAME OF AGENT FOR SERVICE Debra L. Zumwalt 	OF PROCESS				
9. STREET ADDRESS OF AGENT F	OR SERVICE OF PROCESS IN CALIFORNIA, IF AN IN		STATE	ZIP CODE	
Ofc of Gen Counsel, Bldg. 170 3	ard Fl Main Quad	Stanford	CA	94305	
Common Interest Developme	ents	······································			\Box
Development Act, (Califo (California Civil Code sect	ation is an association formed to manage a comila Civil Code section 4000, et seq.) or undion 6500, et seq.). The corporation must file a St Code sections 5405(a) and 6760(a). Please set	er the Commercial and I tatement by Common Inter	ndustrial Common Inte est Development Associ	erest Development	t Act.
11. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED	HEREIN IS TRUE AND CORRECT.				
01/29/2016 Debra L. Zu		VP & Geл Counsel	Delin St	10,000,000	V
DATE TYPE/PRI	INT NAME OF PERSON COMPLETING FORM	TITLE	SIGM	TURE	*



Secretary of State Statement of Information

SI-100

(California Nonprofit, Credit Union and General Cooperative Corporations)

43,

IMPOR	TANT —	Read ins	tructions	before	compl	eting	this	form.

Filing Fee - \$20.00;

Copy Fees – First page \$1.00; each attachment page \$0.50; Certification Fee - \$5.00 plus copy fees

 Corporation Name (Enter the exact name of the corporation as it is currently recorded with the California Secretary of State)

STANFORD HEALTH CARE

FILED

Secretary of State State of California

FEB 0 1 2017

20 20 CC This Space For Office Use Only

2. 7-Digit Secretary of State File Number

C0336653

3. Business Addresses							
a. Street Address of California Prin	cipal Office, if any - Do not list a	P.O. Box	City (no	abbreviations)	State	Zip Cod	8
300 Pasteur Drive H3	200		Stanf	ord	CA	94305	5
b. Mailing Address of Corporation,	If different than item 3a		City (no	abbreviations)	State	Zip Cod	е
•							
4. Officers		uired to list all three of the office added; however, the preprinted			for Chief Executive	Officer	or Chief
a. Chief Executive Officer/	First Name	Middle Name		Last Name			Suffix
David				Entwistle			
Address			City (no	abbreviations)	State	Zip Cod	e
300 Pasteur Drive H3	200		Stanf	ord .	CA	9430	5
b. Secretary	First Name	Middle Name		Last Name			Suffix
Tuuyen				Tran			:
Address			City (no	abbreviations)	State	Zip Cod	0
300 Pasteur Drive H3	200		Stanf	ford	CA	9430	5
c. Chief Financial Officer/	First Name	Middle Name	•	Last Name			Suffix
David				Connor			
Address			City (ne	abbreviations)	State	Zip Cod	le ·
1510 Page Mill Road,			Palo	4 14	l CA	9430	4

5. Agent for Service of Process Item 5a and 5b: If the agent is an individual, the agent must reside in California and Item 5a and 5b must be completed with the agent's name and California address. Item 5c: If the agent is a California Registered Corporate Agent, a current agent registration certificate must be on file with the California Secretary of State and Item 5c must be completed (leave Item 5a-5b blank).

a. California Agent's First Name (if agent is not a corporation)	Middle Name		Last Name			Suffix
DEBRA	L.	٠.	ZUMWALT			
b. Street Address (if agent is not a corporation) - Do not list a P.O. Box	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	City (no	abbreviations)	State	Zip Co	de
450 Serra Mall, Main Quad, Bldg.170, 3rd Floor		Stanf	ord ·	CA	9430	5

6.	Common	Interest	Develo	pments
----	--------	----------	--------	--------

Check here if the corporation is an association formed to manage a common interest development under the Davis-Sterling Common Interest Development Act (California Civil Code section 4000, et seq.) or under the Commercial and Industrial Common Interest Development Act (California Civil Code section 6500, et seq.). The corporation must file a Statement by Common Interest Development Association (Form SI-CID) as required by California Civil Code sections 5405(a) and 6760(a). See instructions.

7.	The In	formati	on conta	ined hereir	n, including	in any	attachments	, is true :	and correct
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1-31-2017

DEBRA L. ZUMWALT


VP/Gen.Counsel

Type or Print Name of Person Completing the Form

Title

2016 California Secretary of State www.sos.ca.gov/business/be

SI-100 (REV 11/2016)







distance between palo alto and oakland

Q

All Maps News Shopping Images More Settings Tools

About 142,000 results (0.60 seconds)

O Palo Alto, California

Oakland, California



42 min (33.4 mi) via I-880 N

Directions

Pal	0	Α	Ito

Head northwest on Middlefield Rd toward Embarcadero Rd

0.4 mi

0.7 mi

2.4 mi

Turn right onto CA-84 E (signs for Fremont 84)

7.8 mi

Keep left to continue on Decoto Rd

0.3 mi

Take the Interstate 880 N ramp to Oakland

0.2 mi

Merge onto I-880 N

20.8 mi

Take exit 41B toward Broadway/Downtown

0.4 mi

Turn right onto Broadway

Oakland, California

These directions are for planning purposes only. You may find that construction projects, traffic, weather, or other events may cause conditions to differ from the map results, and you should plan your route accordingly. You must obey all signs or

notices regarding your route.

44 min (42.0 mi) via US-101 N, CA-92 E and I-880 N

48 min (43.5 mi) via US-101 N

Distance Palo-Alto CA Oakland CA

distancesonline.com/Palo-Alto,CA/Oakland,CA ▼

Oakland,CA (see map). average speed between Palo-Alto,CA Oakland,CA average speed: 45 mph. road distance Palo-Alto,CA Oakland,CA total distance: 33.4 miles. total time including breaks total time: 0h 45min. recomended breaks for Palo-Alto,CA Oakland,CA breaks: fara pauza. travel time Palo-Alto,CA Oakland,CA

Distance between Oakland, CA and Palo Alto, CA

https://www.distance-cities.com/distance-oakland-ca-to-palo-alto-ca ▼

Distance between Oakland and Palo Alto in miles and kilometers. Driving distance and how to go from Oakland, California to Palo Alto, California. How long does it takes to arrive.

Google

dista

distance between palo alto and san jose


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About 302,000 results (0.85 seconds)

O Palo Alto, California

San Jose, California



23 min (17.4 mi) via US-101 S -

Directions

Head northwest on Middlefield Rd toward Embarcadero Rd

98 ft

Turn right onto Embarcadero Rd

1.0 mi

Merge onto US-101 S via the ramp to San Jose

0.4 mi

Merge onto US-101 S

11.7 mi

* *

0.5 mi

Continue onto CA-87 S

Take the CA-87/Guadalupe Pkwy exit

2.6 mi

Take exit 6B for W Julian St toward St James St

0.3 mi

Turn left onto W Julian St

Continue onto W St James St

0.1 mi

Turn right onto N 5th St

0.5 mi

San Jose, California

0.2 mi

These directions are for planning purposes only. You may find that construction projects, traffic, weather, or other events may cause conditions to differ from the map results, and you should plan your route accordingly. You must obey all signs or

27 min (21.7 mi) via I-280 S


26 min (20.8 mi) via US-101 S and CA-237 E

Distance between San Jose united states and Palo Alto united states www.mapcrow.info/Distance_between_San_Jose_US_and_Palo_Alto_US.html ▼ Distance between San Jose united states and Palo Alto united states.

Distance between San Jose, CA and Palo Alto, CA

https://www.distance-cities.com/distance-san-jose-ca-to-palo-alto-ca ▼

Distance between San Jose and Palo Alto in miles and kilometers. Driving distance and how to go from San Jose, California to Palo Alto, California. How long does it takes to arrive.



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
From the Silicon Valley Business Journal: https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2013/07/18/the-list-top-100-silicon-valley.html

Silicon Valley's 10 largest employers - who made the list?

Jul 19, 2013, 6:34am PDT

Silicon Valley is home to some of the nation's largest companies - and employers. In fact, if you added up the number of full-time local staff at the 100 largest employers in Silicon Valley, you'd have the population of Newark, New Jersey. Or'Toledo. That's 284,513 people.

In this week's paper, you'll see all 100 of the largest employers, ranked by full-time staff. They range from tech giants and sprawling health care systems, to massive universities and municipalities.



Click above to see the top 10 Silicon Valley employers.

Related: See the 25 highest paid CEOs in Silicon Valley

In the slideshow, get a sneak peek at the 10 biggest. Then turn to the July 19 issue to see them all, including the 26 companies debuting on this year's list.


Information for this year's list was obtained from employer representatives, Business Journal research, city or county financial reports.

Subscribers can see the more detailed top 100 list. Click here to find out more.

B3X

T BACK TO ARTICLE

Silicon Valley's 10 largest employers - who made the list?



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Development, Construction, and Management of multi-residential rental housing located at NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS

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No. 6: Stanford University

Address: 450 Serra Mall, Stanford 94305 FTE employees in Silicon Valley: 11,442

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No. 9: Stanford Hospital & Clinics

Address: 300 Pasteur Drive, Stanford 94305 FTE employees in Silicon Valley: 8,451

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Silicon Valley Newsletters and Alerts

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Morning Edition >> Afternoon Edition >> Breaking
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VILLARREAL HUTNER PC 1 LARA VILLARREAL HUTNER, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 178639 E-Mail: lhutner@vhattorneys.com LAUREN M. COOPER, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 254580 3 E-Mail: lcooper@vhattorneys.com TIMOTHY L. REED, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 258034 4 E-Mail: treed@vhattorneys.com 575 Market Street, Suite 1700 5 San Francisco, California 94105 Telephone: 415.543.4200 6 Facsimile: 415.512.7674 7 CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, INC. CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 080823 8 E-Mail: chris@whelanlawoffices.com 11246 Gold Express Drive, Suite 100 9 Gold River, California 95670 Telephone: 916.635.5577 10 Facsimile: 916.635.9159 11 Attorneys for Plaintiff 12 **QIQIUIA YOUNG** 13 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 14 COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 15 RENE C. DAVIDSON COURTHOUSE 16 QIQIUIA YOUNG, Case No. RG17877051 17 Plaintiff, **DECLARATION OF LARA** 18 VILLARREAL HUTNER IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF QIQIUIA YOUNG'S 19 **OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT** THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR STANFORD HEALTH CARE'S MOTION 20 UNIVERSITY, STANFORD HEALTH TO TRANSFER VENUE AND MOTION CARE, STANFORD HOSPITAL AND FOR SANCTIONS, AND FURTHER IN 21 CLINICS, CHANRATH FLORES, and DOES SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST 1 through 50, inclusive, 22 FOR SANCTIONS 23 Defendants. Judge: Hon. Ronni B. MacLaren Date: December 8, 2017 24 9:00 a.m. Time: Dept.: 25 25 Reservation Number: R-1899966 26 27

ALAMEDA COUNTY

NOV 27 2017

ASURCHYPIK COURT

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I, Lara Villarreal Hutner, declare:

- 1. I am a partner at Villarreal Hutner PC. I am licensed to practice law in the State of California, and I am counsel of record for plaintiff Qiqiuia Young ("Plaintiff") in the above-captioned matter. I make this declaration in support of Plaintiff's opposition to the motion of defendant Stanford Health Care to transfer venue and motion for sanctions. I make this declaration based upon personal knowledge including but not limited to knowledge I have gained in the regular course of my representation of Plaintiff in connection with this matter, except where otherwise specifically indicated below. If called as a witness, I could and would testify competently to the facts stated in this declaration.
- 2. On behalf of Plaintiff, I caused this lawsuit to be filed in Alameda County because (a) I understand and believe that Alameda County is a properly available venue under applicable law, and I researched the same – including reviewing the very case law Stanford Health Care cites in its moving papers – before filing the Complaint in Alameda County, (b) Plaintiff and many of her non-party and adverse witnesses reside there, and (c) I believe Plaintiff is far more likely to have a fair and impartial trial in Alameda County than in Santa Clara County, where I believe Plaintiff would very likely be subjected to improper and unfair bias against her and in favor of Stanford and its related defendants. My belief in that regard is based primarily on a few things: Stanford and its affiliates' enormous presence, connections, and influence in Santa Clara County, their carefullycrafted image thereat, and my (privileged) investigation which has indicated that Stanford and its affiliates often and unfairly benefit when they defend cases in Santa Clara County. Some of these issues are addressed, with true and correct citations to evidence, in the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") at paragraphs 1, 23, 41. Further, the document, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, and which I caused to be printed from (and which is publicly accessible via the "quick facts" button on) SHC's web page at https://stanfordhealthcare.org/about-us.html, admits that approximately 15,000 persons have professional affiliations with Stanford Health Care, including more than 10,000 employees and more than 2,500 medical staff.
- 3. Attached collectively hereto as **Exhibit B** are true and correct copies of the correspondence between me and counsel at Gordon & Rees regarding their request that Plaintiff

stipulate to transferring venue and threatening sanctions against me personally, as well as my notice that, if forced to oppose this baseless motion, Plaintiff would seek sanctions.

- 4. Since we filed the lawsuit, our decision to do so in Alameda County, and for the reasons stated above, has already proven wise. Stanford Health Care began seeking to capitalize on its power and influence in Santa Clara County and to "poison" the jury pool in Santa Clara County against Plaintiff beginning the day after she filed this action. I base that conclusion on the fact that Plaintiff, who is just a health care technician working for Stanford Health Care (see FAC ¶ 43), was publicly singled out as a supposed liar by Stanford Health Care President and CEO David Entwistle on September 29, 2017, the day after she filed this lawsuit seeking to enforce lawful rights. President and CEO Entwistle emailed all Stanford Health Care employees and affiliates, and, on information and belief, Stanford University employees as well, and sought to "poison" opinion, and a potential Santa Clara County jury pool, by (among other things) calling Plaintiff's allegations "grossly exaggerated and largely inaccurate" and asserting that "S[tanford] H[ealth] C[are] will vigorously defend this lawsuit." A true and correct copy of President and CEO Entwistle's memo that was emailed to Stanford employees, which I obtained in the regular course of my representation of Plaintiff in this action, is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
- 5. Stanford Health Care did not make a genuine effort to meet and confer with me before filing its motion to transfer venue and motion for sanctions. That conclusion may be inferred from, without limitation, the fact that the case law Stanford Health Care cited in its emails for the proposition that when a claim is asserted under the Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), the FEHA venue rules trump the venue rules under the Code of Civil Procedure does <u>not</u> make such a conclusion, and Stanford Health Care filed its motion the very next day after I responded to its demand that I stipulate to transfer venue; in light of the amount of time its attorneys aver they spent on the motion, it may be inferred that Stanford Health Care already prepared its motion before even receiving my response. It also is a fact that Stanford Health Care filed its motion within 6 days of service of the First Amended Complaint, and more than 25 days before the other defendants filed their responsive pleading. Of particular significance is the fact that defendant Chanrath Flores who is an Alameda County resident joined in Stanford Health Care's motion to transfer venue to Santa

Clara County, despite the obvious inconvenience to her as a party and a witness in this lawsuit. (see Motion for Joinder of Defendants). These facts, coupled with the facts above and the absence of any other explanation for Stanford Health Care's conduct, further support the inference that the Stanford defendants – as well as defendant Flores – desire to transfer venue to Santa Clara County for one reason in particular: because of the perceived and unfair advantages Stanford and its affiliates do and will enjoy if they litigate in that county.

- 6. Dr. Kim Rhoads is the person referred to as "the Cancer Center surgeon" throughout the FAC (see, e.g., FAC \P 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 20). As the quantity and breadth of the allegations concerning her indicate, she is a key witness for Plaintiff in this action.
- 7. I sought a declaration of Dr. Rhoads in support of Plaintiff's opposition to Stanford Health Care's motion, but because of a prior agreement with Stanford and Stanford Health Care, Dr. Rhoads is unable to supply pertinent information via a declaration, and can only do so if subpoenaed and deposed. Upon being so informed, on November 7, 2017, I issued a deposition subpoena for Dr. Rhoads, setting the deposition for the earliest possible date, November 27, 2017, the date when Plaintiff's opposition to the motion to transfer venue and for sanctions is due. A true and correct copy of the notice of Dr. Rhoads's deposition, which includes her deposition subpoena as an exhibit, is attached hereto as Exhibit D. Dr. Rhoads and her current attorney intended to cooperate with the subpoena, but Stanford Health Care and its attorneys interfered with it, frivolously and in bad faith (as shown by the following facts and evidence). I had multiple communications with the defendants' seven attorneys, none of the several of whom would make himself or herself available for the deposition on the scheduled date. Based on their stated unavailability, I attempted to negotiate a reasonable alternative date for the deposition and a short continuance of the hearing on Stanford Health Care's motion to accommodate the delay, including by taking a very short deposition limited to venue issues and by continuing the deposition to the date that the motion is presently set for hearing (and which would have been necessarily made available by the contemplated, brief continuance of the hearing). After substantial back-and-forth defense counsel made a proposal to do this, and we agreed to it. But defense counsel then reneged; and not only that, but they surreptitiously filed a motion to quash the deposition subpoena, without ever

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attempting to confer about it, and not even mentioning it to me in our ongoing communications about the deposition, including in their last communication with me at 3:27 p.m. (the day before Thanksgiving – the last business day before Dr. Rhoads' deposition was to take place) in which Plaintiff's counsel was informed that Stanford Health Care's attorneys were reneging on their offer to continue the hearing date to allow Dr. Rhoads' deposition to go forward at a time convenient for defense counsel that would still allow Plaintiff to obtain and further submit evidence about Dr. Rhoads in support of her opposition to the motion to transfer and for sanctions. Despite the fact that the motion to quash had already been filed, defense counsel made no mention of that fact in her email. The motion to quash is groundless and frivolous on its face, as there is no basis to quash the subpoena; the only "problem" with the subpoena was defense counsel's refusal to appear for the deposition and desire to prevent Plaintiff from engaging in discovery to which she is entitled and from securing further evidence highly pertinent to her opposition to Stanford Health Care's motion. Given the defense's blatant interference with Plaintiff's discovery, I took them up on their offer to stipulate to certain facts relating to Dr. Rhoads, drafted and sent them a proposed stipulation at 5:21 p.m. Not one of the seven attorneys representing Stanford ever responded to my request. All of the matters I set forth in that proposed stipulation are matters that, based on all of the information otherwise known to me, I expected to unequivocally establish in the deposition of Dr. Rhoads; and I also expected to unequivocally and further establish that attending trial in Alameda County would be convenient for Dr. Rhoads, and that attending trial in Santa Clara County would be inconvenient.

- 8. Attached here as **Exhibit E** is a true and correct copy of my foregoing communications (letters and emails) with defense counsel as well as the stipulation I proposed. I note additionally that in the email from defense counsel, Morgan Forsey, on November 17, 2017, defense counsel therein expressed a willingness specifically to stipulate that Dr. Rhoads is an Alameda County resident.
- 9. Following notice that Stanford had filed a surreptitious motion to quash, I also reached out to Dr. Rhoads's current attorney to determine if he would provide a declaration concerning the subpoena, related document requests, and the number of documents he prepared to produce at Dr. Rhoads' thwarted deposition on November 27, 2017 that she maintains at her

residence. He considered the request, but ultimately did not agree to it, based on his expressed concern that Dr. Rhoads's agreement with the defendants precluding him from doing so. Whether his assessment of the agreement was accurate or not (it may or may not be; I do not have a copy of the agreement), that is the reason he stated for not supplying a declaration.

- 10. Attached as **Exhibit F** hereto is a true and correct copy of reports that I caused to be generated and printed from lexisnexis.com in October and November of 2017, which identify the location where several of Plaintiff's witnesses reside. (Tature and substance of these witnesses' anticipated testimony is set forth in the Declaration of Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young In Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue and Motion for Sanctions at paragraphs 5-15). As the reports show, each of the following witnesses resides in Alameda County, California:
 - a. Dr. Kim Rhoads;
 - b. Cynthia ("Cindy") DePorte;
 - c. Estedar Gizaw;
 - d. Winnie Suguitan;
 - e. Madonna Paulin;
 - f. Leah Lillard; and
 - g. Odalicia Benavidez.
- 11. Cynthia DePorte is a further, key witness we intend to call in support of Plaintiff's case at trial. Based on my investigation into the facts and witnesses with knowledge of facts pertinent to Plaintiff's case, and upon the facts that I obtained thereby, I determined (and am informed and believe) that Ms. DePorte is not an employee of Stanford Health Care or Stanford University; that she resides in Alameda County; and that she has knowledge pertinent to Plaintiff's claims. The sources of the information by which I determined these facts were Ms. DePorte herself, and Plaintiff, who have this information based on their first-hand involvement in the conditions or events that are the subjects of the information. At the time I obtained that information and ascertained the facts, I used them to prepare a record thereof, which I made in the form of a declaration, and which I wrote in the regular course of my representation of Plaintiff in this action. A true and correct copy of that declaration is attached as **Exhibit G** hereto. At all times I have

maintained that declaration in my office's electronic files pursuant to our ordinary file management procedures. That declaration sets forth further facts concerning the nature and substance of the testimony that I expect Ms. DePorte will provide at trial, again, facts that I determined (and which I am informed and believe are true) based on my investigation and obtaining of information and facts as I stated above. Based on these further facts, I believe Ms. DePorte's testimony at trial will be highly material and favorable to Plaintiff's case herein. I presented the declaration to Ms. DePorte, but she declined to sign it based on her concern that there may be a conflict between her signing the declaration and her prior non-cooperation agreement that she has with Stanford or Stanford Health Care.

- 12. A true and correct copy of an article in the Silicon Valley Business Journal dated July 19, 2013, titled "Silicon Valley's 10 largest employers who made the list?" published and publicly-available at the web page https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2013/07/18/the-list-top-100-silicon-valley.html is attached hereto as **Exhibit H**. This record demonstrates that as of 2013, Stanford Health Care is the ninth-largest employer in Silicon Valley, with 8,451 full-time employees there; that Stanford University is the sixth-largest employer in Silicon Valley, with 11,442 full-time employees there; and that combined, they are the largest employer of any kind, public or private, in Silicon Valley (*i.e.*, in Santa Clara County), with nearly 20,000 employees there as of 2013.
- 13. I have spent more than 25 hours preparing this opposition to Stanford Health Care's motion to transfer venue and for sanctions against me, as well as the evidence in support of the same; I further anticipate that I will spent another 5 hours preparing for and attending the hearing on this motion. I received my J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School in 1995 and I graduated from the University of California, Berkeley in 1991. I have been admitted to practice law in California since 1995, and my exclusive area of practice is, and has been, employment law. I have been rated AV by Martindale Hubble for over a decade, and recognized by Super Lawyers. I have spent the last 22 years representing employers, and I have owned my own woman-and-minority-owned law firm in San Francisco for more than a decade, since 2006. I represent and advise many of the nation's largest (Fortune 500) employers; I have represented Plaintiff since 2015. Before starting my own firm, and until 2006, I was Special Counsel at Sheppard Mullin, where my hourly rate was

in the range of \$400. Prior to joining Sheppard Mullin, I was an associate at Quinn Emanuel Urquart Oliver & Hedges. I first-chaired my first case as a 4th year attorney in 1999, and prevailed; and I have prevailed in each of the three cases I have arbitrated or tried on behalf of defendant employers since then. My hourly rate is \$650.

- 14. My co-counsel, Christopher H. Whelan, has spent 5 hours preparing the opposition to this motion, as well as the evidence in support of the same. Based on my review of public record, Mr. Whelan received his J.D. from the University of California, Hastings and graduated from UCLA. He has been admitted to practice law since 1978. Mr. Whelan is AV-rated by Martindale Hubble, is recognized by Super Lawyers. I am informed and believe that Mr. Whelan tried his first case 34 years ago and has received 7-and-8-figure verdicts in 13 cases he has tried, and further has received 13 awards of punitive damages at trial. Mr. Whelan's practice is located in Sacramento, California and his hourly rate is \$750.
- 15. Plaintiff seeks sanctions in the amount of \$23,250.00 against Defendant Stanford Health Care and/or its counsel, Gordon & Rees LLP and Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP. These sanctions consist solely of attorneys' fees expended to oppose this motion, as set forth in Paragraphs 12 and 13 above.

16.

I declare under the penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the state of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at San Francisco, California this 27th day of November, 2017

LARA VILLARREAL HUTNER



Stanford Health Care







Life Flight launches **500** patient transports annually





613 Licensed Beds 477 in use



49 Operating Rooms



689,417 Ambulatory Visits




22,745 Walk-in Visitors




17 Outdoor Reller Concerts (summer)



1,592 Original Art Pieces



Our People





Translators & Interpreters

We offer Spanish, Mandarin, Cantonese, Burmese, Russian, Vietnamese and American Sign Language and access to as many as 200 languages through phone interpretation



All-time Stanford Medicine Nobel Laureates



Dogs in Pet Assisted Wellness (PAWS) Program



Hours of Volunteer Service

From: Michael Bruno [mailto:mbruno@grsm.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2017 2:48 PM

To: Lara Villarreal Hutner; Christopher Whelan (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com) (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com)

Cc: Alyson Cabrera; Pamela Ng

Subject: Young v. SHC

Dear Lara:

I write with respect to the filing of the <u>Young v. SHC</u> case in Alameda County Superior Court. As you are aware, it is my client's position that this is not the proper venue for this case. As the Complaint asserts several causes of action for violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), this action should have been filed in Santa Clara County Superior Court, the location where the "unlawful practices" alleged under FEHA purportedly occurred.

It is well established that a defendant is entitled to have an action tried in the county of his or her residence unless the action falls within some exception to the general venue rule. (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. 395, Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 483 (citing Kaluzok v. Brisson (1946) 27 Cal. 2d 760, 763-764; Mosby v. Superior Court, 43 (1974) Cal.App.3d at pp. 223-224; Holstein v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 708, 710).) Brown v. Superior Court established that the FEHA venue provision under Government Code section 12965 controls over the general venue rule as to the FEHA causes of actions and also to related claims pled under alternative theories but based on the same set of facts. Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal. 3d at 487, 488.

Government Code section 12965(b) states, in relevant part:

An action may be brought in any county in the state in which the unlawful practice is alleged to have been committed, in the county in which the records relevant to the practice are maintained and administered, or in the county in which the aggrieved person would have worked or would have had access to the public accommodation but for the alleged unlawful practice, but if the defendant is not found within any of these counties, an action may be brought within the county of the defendant's residence or principal office.

The term "unlawful practice" refers to conduct in violation of Government Code section 12940 et seq., namely discrimination, harassment, and retaliation on the basis of enumerated characteristics, including race. Under this section, the proper venue should be Santa Clara County Superior Court because the unlawful practices claimed, i.e. the alleged discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, allegedly occurred in SHC's Cancer Center located in Palo Alto. None of the alleged "unlawful practices" occurred in Alameda County.

Further, while Ms. Young vaguely alleges that the relevant "records" are maintained in Alameda County, this could only be true regarding Ms. Young's records related to her non-FEHA claims. Alleged conduct related to the non-FEHA claims does not constitute "unlawful practices" under Government Code section 12940 et seq., nor are such claims alternative theories based on the same set of facts as the FEHA claims. In reality, the records related to Ms. Young's FEHA claims are maintained by the employer, SHC, which is located in Palo Alto. Thus, the FEHA venue provision requires that Ms. Young's claims are properly heard in Santa Clara County Superior Court, not in Alameda County Superior Court.

Further, this is a true "mixed action" case, which is a lawsuit with at least two causes of action, each governed by a different statute. *Gallin v. Superior Court* (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 541, 545. Under the mixed action rule, a lawsuit must be transferred in its entirety when any alleged claim warrants adjudication in a different court. *Id.* Otherwise, plaintiffs could assert frivolous causes of action merely to forum

shop. Jhirmack Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal. App.3d 715, 720. Here, the mixed action rule requires a transfer of venue for the entire lawsuit to the venue in which the FEHA claims are properly heard.

Finally, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 397(c), the court has discretion to transfer the case to another proper county "when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change." (See also Cal. Civ. Code Proc. 396b(a), 397(a).) This test is met here. The alleged FEHA violations purportedly occurred in, and the relevant records are located in, Palo Alto. Further, the relevant witnesses work in or near Palo Alto. Lastly, the transfer would not inconvenience Ms. Young because she still currently works for SHC in or near Palo Alto.

For all of these reasons, I am requesting that you let me know by the close of business on Monday October 9th whether you will stipulate to transfer this case to Santa Clara County Superior Court. Alternatively, we may be willing to stipulate to transfer this case to San Mateo County Superior Court, given that your client currently works at a SHC location in Redwood City and seems to allege that at least some purported "unlawful practices" under FEHA occurred there.

If you are not agreeable to either option, we will have no choice but to file a motion for transfer of venue. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 396b(b), we will also move for our reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in making the motion to transfer. As you are surely aware, under that section, those expenses and fees shall be the personal liability of the attorney, not the party.

I look forward to your response by October 9th.

All the best,

Michael

MICHAEL D. BRUNO | Partner GORDON & REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI

275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 D: 415-875-3126 | P: 415-986-5900 | F: 415-986-8054 mbruno@grsm.com

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GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI LLP http://www.grsm.com

From:

Lara Villarreal Hutner

Sent:

Monday, October 09, 2017 9:02 AM

To:

Michael Bruno; Lauren Cooper; Timothy Reed; James Riley

Cc:

Christopher Whelan (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com) (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com);

Alyson Cabrera; Pamela Ng

Subject:

Re: Young v. SHC

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Best, Lara

Sent from my iPhone

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Michael

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From:

Michael Bruno <mbruno@grsm.com>

Sent:

Monday, October 09, 2017 10:24 AM

To:

Lara Villarreal Hutner; Lauren Cooper; Timothy Reed; James Riley

Cc:

Christopher Whelan (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com) (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com);

Alyson Cabrera; Pamela Ng

Subject:

RE: Young v. SHC

Importance:

High

Lara.

I will look forward to hearing from you by the end of the business day tomorrow.

I will copy Lauren and Tim in the future.

MDB

From: Lara Villarreal Hutner [mailto:LHutner@vhattorneys.com]

Sent: Monday, October 09, 2017 9:02 AM

To: Michael Bruno; Lauren Cooper; Timothy Reed; James Riley

Cc: Christopher Whelan (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com) (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com); Alyson Cabrera; Pamela Ng

Subject: Re: Young v. SHC

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All the best,

Michael

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GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI LLP http://www.grsm.com

From: Lara Villarreal Hutner

Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2017 4:36 PM

To: 'Michael Bruno'; Christopher Whelan (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com) (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com); Lauren

Cooper; Timothy Reed

Cc: Alyson Cabrera; Pamela Ng

Subject: RE: Qiqiuia Young v. Chanrath Flores, Stanford University, Stanford Health Care

Michael,

First, we have filed a First Amended Complaint in this action and will provide you with a copy of it shortly. After you and your clients review and consider the overwhelming facts supporting venue in Alameda County, please let us know of their decision regarding whether they will in fact attempt to transfer venue. As you know, the Complaint - and now First Amended Complaint - lists multiple grounds for proper venue in Alameda County, under the Code of Civil Procedure and the Fair Employment and Housing Act — which provides a "wide choice of venue afforded plaintiffs … by permitting venue in a county which plaintiffs deem the most appropriate and convenient." Brown v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 478, 486 (1984).

Here, the elephant in the room is your Stanford clients' transparent desire to transfer this case to Santa Clara County, where they are the 800-pound gorilla. If your clients choose to proceed with such a specious attempt at forum-shopping – in this case in which Stanford's chickens are finally coming home to roost (in Alameda, not down at "The Farm") – we will seek reimbursement for our time and costs. I sincerely hope that will not be necessary.

Best regards, Lara

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq. Villarreal Hutner PC

575 Market Street, 17th Floor San Francisco, California 94105 Direct 415.632.4101 Fax 415.512.7674 www.vhattorneys.com

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From: Michael Bruno [mailto:mbruno@grsm.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2017 2:48 PM

To: Lara Villarreal Hutner; Christopher Whelan (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com) (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com)

Cc: Alyson Cabrera; Pamela Ng

Subject: Young v. SHC

Dear Lara:

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I look forward to your response by October 9th.


All the best,

Michael

MICHAEL D. BRUNO | Partner GORDON & REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI

275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 D: 415-875-3126 | P: 415-986-5900 | F: 415-986-8054 mbruno@grsm.com

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GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI LLP http://www.grsm.com

From:

Lara Villarreal Hutner

Sent:

Wednesday, October 11, 2017 10:30 AM

To:

Michael Bruno; Christopher Whelan (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com)

(Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com); Lauren Cooper; Timothy Reed

Cc:

Alyson Cabrera; Pamela Ng; James Riley

Subject:

RE: Qiqiuia Young v. Chanrath Flores, Stanford University, Stanford Health Care

Attachments:

Young_Stanford - FAC [File-Endorsed 2017-10-10].pdf

Michael,

I apologize for the delay – we just got back the conformed copy of the attached First Amended Complaint filed yesterday.

Best regards, Lara

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq.
Villarreal Hutner PC
575 Market Street, 17th Floor
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Direct 415.632.4101 Fax 415.512.7674
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Cooper; Timothy Reed

Cc: Alyson Cabrera; Pamela Ng

Subject: RE: Qiqiuia Young v. Chanrath Flores, Stanford University, Stanford Health Care

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9th.
)1

All the best,

Michael

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From:

Michael Bruno <mbruno@grsm.com>

Sent:

Thursday, October 12, 2017 11:23 AM

To:

Lara Villarreal Hutner; Christopher Whelan (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com)

(Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com); Lauren Cooper; Timothy Reed

Cc:

Alyson Cabrera; Pamela Ng; James Riley

Subject:

RE: Qiqiuia Young v. Chanrath Flores, Stanford University, Stanford Health Care

Dear Lara:

We have reviewed the FAC. Venue is still not proper under the FEHA venue statute (Government Code section 12965(b)). As noted in my prior meet and confer email, the "unlawful practices" (i.e., practices that form the basis of the FEHA claims) have to occur in Alameda County for the case to be properly venued in Alameda County. The facts in the FAC regarding events that allegedly occurred in Alameda County or about records that are allegedly maintained there are not pled in support of the FEHA claims. The FAC still makes clear that the "unlawful practices" under FEHA occurred at SHC, which is located in Santa Clara County. The records related to the FEHA claims are also located in Santa Clara County. Therefore, transfer to Santa Clara County is mandatory. Further, and as noted in my prior letter, "mixed action" cases (asserting claims that have conflicting venue provisions) such as this one must still be transferred in their entirety to the same venue where the FEHA claims are required to be heard (i.e., to Santa Clara County).

For these reasons, I am requesting that you let me know by the close of business on Monday October

16th whether you will stipulate to transfer this case to Santa Clara County Superior Court.

If you are not agreeable, we will move forward with filing a motion for transfer of venue. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 396b(b), we will also move for our reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in making the motion to transfer. As noted previously, under that section, those expenses and fees shall be the personal liability of the attorney, not the party.

All the best,

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From: Lara Villarreal Hutner [mailto:LHutner@vhattorneys.com]

Sent: Wednesday, October 11, 2017 10:30 AM

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Timothy Reed

Cc: Alyson Cabrera; Pamela Ng; James Riley

Subject: RE: Qiqiuia Young v. Chanrath Flores, Stanford University, Stanford Health Care

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Monday, October 16, 2017 3:33 PM

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(Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com); Lauren Cooper; Timothy Reed

Cc:

Alyson Cabrera; Pamela Ng; James Riley

Subject:

RE: Qiqiuia Young v. Chanrath Flores, Stanford University, Stanford Health Care

Michael,

The absolute nature of your statement that "[v]enue still is not proper under the FEHA statute" caused me to go back and re-read the case law you cited (which is the same case law I read in doing my due diligence before ever drafting the Complaint). Not surprisingly, the cases no more support your assertion now than they did when I initially read them.

Moreover, your Stanford clients' threat of sanctions directed at me personally for not acquiescing to their distorted view of the law is precisely the kind of bullying and intimidation tactics that underscore why justice requires Ms. Young's lawsuit remain in Alameda County, the venue she was entitled to select, and selected, as the plaintiff in this action.

Best regards, Lara

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq.
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Cc: Alyson Cabrera; Pamela Ng; James Riley

Subject: RE: Qiqiuia Young v. Chanrath Flores, Stanford University, Stanford Health Care

Dear Lara:

We have reviewed the FAC. Venue is still not proper under the FEHA venue statute (Government Code section 12965(b)). As noted in my prior meet and confer email, the "unlawful practices" (i.e., practices that form the basis of the FEHA claims) have to occur in Alameda County for the case to be properly venued in Alameda County. The facts in the FAC regarding events that allegedly occurred in Alameda County or about

records that are allegedly maintained there are not pled in support of the FEHA claims. The FAC still makes clear that the "unlawful practices" under FEHA occurred at SHC, which is located in Santa Clara County. The records related to the FEHA claims are also located in Santa Clara County. Therefore, transfer to Santa Clara County is mandatory. Further, and as noted in my prior letter, "mixed action" cases (asserting claims that have conflicting venue provisions) such as this one must still be transferred in their entirety to the same venue where the FEHA claims are required to be heard (i.e., to Santa Clara County).

For these reasons, I am requesting that you let me know by the close of business on Monday October 16th whether you will stipulate to transfer this case to Santa Clara County Superior Court.

If you are not agreeable, we will move forward with filing a motion for transfer of venue. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 396b(b), we will also move for our reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in making the motion to transfer. As noted previously, under that section, those expenses and fees shall be the personal liability of the attorney, not the party.

All the best.

Michael

MICHAEL D. BRUNO | Partner GORDON & REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI

275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 D: 415-875-3126 | P: 415-986-5900 | F: 415-986-8054

mbruno@grsm.com

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From: Lara Villarreal Hutner [mailto:LHutner@vhattorneys.com]

Sent: Wednesday, October 11, 2017 10:30 AM

To: Michael Bruno; Christopher Whelan (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com); Lauren Cooper;

Timothy Reed

Cc: Alyson Cabrera; Pamela Ng; James Riley

Subject: RE: Qiqiuia Young v. Chanrath Flores, Stanford University, Stanford Health Care

Michael,

I apologize for the delay – we just got back the conformed copy of the attached First Amended Complaint filed yesterday.

Best regards, Lara

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq. Villarreal Hutner PC 575 Market Street, 17th Floor San Francisco, California 94105 Direct 415.632.4101 Fax 415.512.7674 www.vhattorneys.com

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To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. federal tax advice contained in this document (including any attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein.

From: Lara Villarreal Hutner

Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2017 4:36 PM

To: 'Michael Bruno'; Christopher Whelan (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com) (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com); Lauren

Cooper; Timothy Reed

Cc: Alyson Cabrera; Pamela Ng

Subject: RE: Qiqiuia Young v. Chanrath Flores, Stanford University, Stanford Health Care

Michael,

First, we have filed a First Amended Complaint in this action and will provide you with a copy of it shortly. After you and your clients review and consider the overwhelming facts supporting venue in Alameda County, please let us know of their decision regarding whether they will in fact attempt to transfer venue. As you know, the Complaint - and now First Amended Complaint - lists multiple grounds for proper venue in Alameda County, under the Code of Civil Procedure and the Fair Employment and Housing Act — which provides a "wide choice of venue afforded plaintiffs ... by permitting venue in a county which plaintiffs deem the most appropriate and convenient." Brown v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 478, 486 (1984).

Here, the elephant in the room is your Stanford clients' transparent desire to transfer this case to Santa Clara County, where they are the 800-pound gorilla. If your clients choose to proceed with such a specious attempt at forum-shopping – in this case in which Stanford's chickens are finally coming home to roost (in Alameda, not down at "The Farm") – we will seek reimbursement for our time and costs. I sincerely hope that will not be necessary.

Best regards,

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq.
Villarreal Hutner PC
575 Market Street, 17th Floor
San Francisco, California 94105
Direct 415.632.4101 Fax 415.512.7674
www.vhattorneys.com

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To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. federal tax advice contained in this document (including any attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein.

From: Michael Bruno [mailto:mbruno@grsm.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2017 2:48 PM

To: Lara Villarreal Hutner; Christopher Whelan (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com) (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com)

Cc: Alyson Cabrera; Pamela Ng

Subject: Young v. SHC

Dear Lara:

I write with respect to the filing of the <u>Young v. SHC</u> case in Alameda County Superior Court. As you are aware, it is my client's position that this is not the proper venue for this case. As the Complaint asserts several causes of action for violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), this action should have been filed in Santa Clara County Superior Court, the location where the "unlawful practices" alleged under FEHA purportedly occurred.

It is well established that a defendant is entitled to have an action tried in the county of his or her residence unless the action falls within some exception to the general venue rule. (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. 395, Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 483 (citing Kaluzok v. Brisson (1946) 27 Cal. 2d 760, 763-764; Mosby v. Superior Court, 43 (1974) Cal.App.3d at pp. 223-224; Holstein v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 708, 710).) Brown v. Superior Court established that the FEHA venue provision under Government Code section 12965 controls over the general venue rule as to the FEHA causes of actions and also to related claims pled under alternative theories but based on the same set of facts. Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal. 3d at 487, 488.

Government Code section 12965(b) states, in relevant part:

An action may be brought in any county in the state in which the unlawful practice is alleged to have been committed, in the county in which the records relevant to the practice are maintained and administered, or in the county in which the aggrieved person would have worked or would have had access to the public accommodation but for the alleged unlawful practice, but if the defendant is not found within any of these counties, an action may be brought within the county of the defendant's residence or principal office.

The term "unlawful practice" refers to conduct in violation of Government Code section 12940 et seq., namely discrimination, harassment, and retaliation on the basis of enumerated characteristics, including race. Under this section, the proper venue should be Santa Clara County Superior Court because the unlawful practices claimed, i.e. the alleged discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, allegedly occurred in SHC's Cancer Center located in Palo Alto. None of the alleged "unlawful practices" occurred in Alameda County.

Further, while Ms. Young vaguely alleges that the relevant "records" are maintained in Alameda County, this could only be true regarding Ms. Young's records related to her non-FEHA claims. Alleged conduct related to the non-FEHA claims does not constitute "unlawful practices" under Government Code section 12940 et seq., nor are such claims alternative theories based on the same set of facts as the FEHA claims. In reality, the records related to Ms. Young's FEHA claims are maintained by the employer, SHC, which is located in Palo Alto. Thus, the FEHA venue provision requires that Ms. Young's claims are properly heard in Santa Clara County Superior Court, not in Alameda County Superior Court.

Further, this is a true "mixed action" case, which is a lawsuit with at least two causes of action, each governed by a different statute. *Gallin v. Superior Court* (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 541, 545. Under the mixed action rule, a lawsuit must be transferred in its entirety when any alleged claim warrants adjudication in a different court. *Id.* Otherwise, plaintiffs could assert frivolous causes of action merely to forum

shop. Jhirmack Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal. App. 3d 715, 720. Here, the mixed action rule requires a transfer of venue for the entire lawsuit to the venue in which the FEHA claims are properly heard.

Finally, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 397(c), the court has discretion to transfer the case to another proper county "when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change." (See also Cal. Civ. Code Proc. 396b(a), 397(a).) This test is met here. The alleged FEHA violations purportedly occurred in, and the relevant records are located in, Palo Alto. Further, the relevant witnesses work in or near Palo Alto. Lastly, the transfer would not inconvenience Ms. Young because she still currently works for SHC in or near Palo Alto.

For all of these reasons, I am requesting that you let me know by the close of business on Monday October 9th whether you will stipulate to transfer this case to Santa Clara County Superior Court. Alternatively, we may be willing to stipulate to transfer this case to San Mateo County Superior Court, given that your client currently works at a SHC location in Redwood City and seems to allege that at least some purported "unlawful practices" under FEHA occurred there.

If you are not agreeable to either option, we will have no choice but to file a motion for transfer of venue. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 396b(b), we will also move for our reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in making the motion to transfer. As you are surely aware, under that section, those expenses and fees shall be the personal liability of the attorney, not the party.

I look forward to your response by October 9th.

All the best,


Michael

MICHAEL D. BRUNO | Partner GORDON & REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI

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GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI LLP http://www.grsm.com



Office of the CEO

September 29, 2017



Dear Colleagues,

I am writing in relation to media coverage you may have seen this week regarding a Stanford Health Care employee. I want to ensure that you have the facts about this unfortunate situation.

A lawsuit has been filed by a current employee with allegations of racism and patient safety issues that are grossly exaggerated and largely inaccurate. SHC is fully committed to a diverse, respectful, and inclusive workplace, and not only encourages, but requires, all employees to raise concerns that they believe may affect the patient experience or the workplace.

Contrary to what you may see in the media, SHC has been extremely proactive in addressing the employee's concerns.

- Although the employee filing the suit was shown a photo of another employee covered in a sheet in 2014, all of the employees involved in that incident were terminated by SHC, including those who merely saw the photo and did not report it to management.
- I, and the Dean of the School of Medicine at Stanford, have personally met with Cancer Center leaders and faculty to deliver the broader message that, while SHC did the right thing to terminate all those involved in the 2014 incident, such behavior -- regardless of whether it is

intended as a prank or an act of hate -- will never be tolerated at SHC. I have conveyed, and will continue to convey, that SHC has zero tolerance for conduct that promotes disrespect of another's race, culture, gender or lifestyle, and anyone who learns of any behavior which is offensive, demeaning or hurtful, needs to act on it immediately using the many resources SHC has, including through HR and leadership.

Finally, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), an
independent agency that certifies and accredits health care organizations, has investigated
those issues raised by the employee and found that either there was no issue, or that SHC had
resolved the issue. No action has ever been taken against SHC for the purported safety issues
raised by the employee. SHC is fully dedicated to patient safety and takes aggressive proactive
efforts to ensure safe and quality care.


At every turn, SHC has responded proactively and lawfully when this employee raised concerns about her workplace and SHC will vigorously defend this lawsuit. Although the lawsuit also names Stanford University as a defendant, the actions the employee claims happened to her arise from her employment by SHC and do not involve the University.

I regret that it is necessary to communicate broadly about any individual SHC employee; however, the media coverage in relation to this lawsuit requires that our community receive this information.

The essential values represented throughout Stanford Medicine are important to all of us and I appreciate your continued commitment to ensuring they are upheld.

David Entwistle

President & CEO



			·				
1 2 3 4 5 6	TIMOTHY L. REED, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 258034 E-Mail: treed@vhattorneys.com 575 Market Street, Suite 1700 San Francisco, California 94105 Telephone: 415.543.4200						
7 8 9 10	CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, INC. CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 080823 E-Mail: chris@whelanlawoffices.com 11246 Gold Express Drive, Suite 100 Gold River, California 95670 Telephone: 916.635.5577						
11	Attorneys for Plaintiff QIQIUIA YOUNG						
12							
13	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA						
14	COUNTY C	OF ALAMEDA					
15	RENE C. DAVIDSON COURTHOUSE						
16							
17	QIQIUIA YOUNG,	Case No. RG1787	77051				
18	Plaintiff,	PLAINTIFF QIO	QIUIA YOUNG'S NOTICE				
19	v.	TO SUBPOENA	POSITION PURSUANT OF KIM F. RHOADS,				
20	THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY, STANFORD HEALTH	M.D., MPH	9. 4. 1. 90. 9017				
21	CARE, STANFORD HOSPITAL AND CLINICS, CHANRATH FLORES and DOES	Action Filed: FAC Filed:	September 28, 2017 October 10, 2017				
22	1 through 50, inclusive,	Trial Date:	None set				
23	Defendants.	Date: Time:	November 27, 2017 10:00 a.m.				
24		Location:	Villarreal Hutner PC 575 Market Street				
25			Suite 1700 San Francisco, CA 94105				
26	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,						
27	·	•					
28		•	•				
- 1	1 100 1000						

Case No. RG17877051

TO DEFENDANTS THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY, STANFORD HEALTH CARE, STANFORD HOSPITAL AND CLINICS, CHANRATH FLORES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.010, et seq., plaintiff Qiqiuia Young ("Plaintiff") through her counsel of record in this matter, shall take the deposition upon oral examination of Kim F. Rhoads, M.D., MPH, commencing on November 27, 2017 at 10:00 a.m., at Villarreal Hutner PC, 575 Market Street, Suite 1700, San Francisco, CA 94105, and continue from day to day, weekends and holidays excluded, until completed.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that the testimony at said deposition shall be recorded by audio, videotape, stenographically, and/or in instantaneous "real time" transcription before an officer duly authorized to administer oaths at the date, time, and place set forth above.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Deposition Subpoena for Personal Appearance and Production of Documents and Things to KIM F. RHOADS, M.D., MPH.

Plaintiff reserves the right to use the videotaped recordings of said deposition at trial.

Dated: November 7, 2017

VILLARREAL HUTNER PC CHRISTOPHER H. WHELANANC.

By

LARA VILLARREAL HUTNER CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN

Attorneys for Plaintiff QIQIUIA YOUNG

Exhibit A

(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)

(Proof of service on reverse)

Page 1 of

VATURE OF PERSON ISSUING SUBPOENA)

Attorney for Plaintiff OIQIUIA YOUNG

Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California SUBP-020 [Rev. January 1, 2009]

Date issued: November 7, 2017

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq.

	P-0	

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Qiqiuia Young

CASE NUMBER:

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: The Leland Stanford Junior University, et al.

RG17877051

PROOF (UBPOENA FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE DOCUMENTS AND THINGS			
I served this Deposition Secopy to the person served	ubpoena for Personal Appearance an as follows:	nd Production of Documents and Things by personally delive	ering a		
a. Person served (name):	Steven L. Robinson, Esq., att	torney for Kim Rhoads, M.D., MPH			
b. Address where served:	· .				
	f Mayor Joseph L. Alioto and A	Angela Alioto			
	Street, San Francisco, CA 9411	. •			
c. Date of delivery: Nov	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
d. Time of delivery:					
e. Witness fees and milea	ge both ways (check one):				
	Amount: \$				
(2) were not pa	aid. red to the witness's				
, ,	rea to the witness's y employer as				
	Government Code				
section 680	97.2. The amount				
tendered w	as (specify): \$	<u> </u>			
f. Fee for service:	\$				
	or service on (date): November 7,	2017			
3. Person serving:					
a Not a registered California process server b California sheriff or marshal					
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	gistration under Business and Profess				
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 g Exempt from registration under Business and Professions Code section 22451 h. Name, address, telephone number, and, if applicable, county of registration and number: 					
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I declare under penalty of perju	ry under the laws of the State of	(For California sheriff or marshal use only)			
California that the foregoing is t	rue and correct.	I certify that the foregoing is true and correct.			
Date: November 7, 2017		Date:			
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(SIG	NATURE)	(SIGNATURE)			
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Qiqiuia Young v. The Leland Stanford Junior University, et al. Alameda Superior Court Case No. RG17877051

Deposition Subpoena for Personal Appearance and Production of Documents and Things Attachment 3

The records to be produced are described as follows:

- 1. All documents in Dr. Kim Rhoads' possession, custody, or control referring to or regarding discrimination, harassment, or retaliation against Qiqiuia Young by Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University and any of its agents and employees.
- 2. All documents supporting Dr. Kim Rhoads' belief that Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University engaged in unlawful discrimination or retaliation against her.
- 3. All documents referring to or reflecting the incident on or about October 31, 2014 where an employee of Stanford Health Care/Stanford University was photographed wearing a sheet and appearing to be a member of the Ku Klux Klan ("the KKK incident").
- 4. All documents referring or reflecting the incident in which Natalie Burazon photographed a patient's genitals.
- 5. All documents referring to or reflecting Kathryn Gail Bailey's knowledge of the KKK incident, including but not limited to any document referring to or reflecting Ms. Bailey's knowledge of the incident prior to it being reported by Qiqiuia Young in December of 2015.
- 6. All documents reflecting any retaliation by Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University against Qiqiuia Young, including retaliation by anyone in the administration or management of Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University.
- 7. All documents referring to or reflecting any failure to promote Qiqiuia Young by Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University
- 8. All documents referring to or reflecting the closing of Stanford Health Care's Pelvic Floor Clinic in or around 2015.
- All documents referring to or reflecting Stanford Health Care's and/or Stanford University's failure to train staff.

- 10. All documents referring to or reflecting actual or potential patient endangerment at any facility of Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University, including but not limited to documents referring to or reflecting the failure to properly maintain, perform regular checks on, and/or ensure the proper operation of the "crash cart" formerly located in the Stanford Health Care Cancer Center and risk of patient infection.
- 11. All documents referring to or reflecting the failure of Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University to accurately maintain log books for the "crash cart" formerly located in the Stanford Health Care Cancer Center.
- 12. All original copies of the log books used for the "crash cart" formerly located in the Stanford Health Care Cancer Center and prior to Stanford's fraudulent revisions to the logs.
- 13. All documents referring to, reflecting, or comprising any report Dr. Kim Rhoads made to the Joint Commission regarding Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University.
- 14. All documents referring to or reflecting the risk that rubber bands on hemorrhoid ligators were being reused at any facility of Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University.
- 15. All documents referring to or reflecting "near misses" relating to patient endangerment at any facility of Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University, including but not limited to any "near miss" involving the reuse of dirty scopes.
- 16. All documents referring to, reflecting, or comprising any report made to Dr. Kim Rhoads by anyone regarding black mold at any facility of Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University, including but not limited to the Stanford South Bay Cancer Center.
- 17. All documents referring to, reflecting, or comprising any report made by Dr. Kim Rhoads regarding black mold at any facility of Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University, including any report made to Sri Seshardi and/or Stanford Health Care Chief Operating Officer James Hereford.
- 18. All documents referring to or reflecting any mold abatement effort at any facility of Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University, including but not limited to the Stanford South Bay Cancer Center.

19. All documents referring to, reflecting, or comprising any complaint Dr. Kim Rhoads made to Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University regarding race discrimination and retaliation, including but not limited to any documents referring to or reflecting any complaint made on behalf of Qiqiuia Young.

- 20. All documents referring to or reflecting any investigation into any complaint Dr. Kim Rhoads made to Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University regarding race discrimination and retaliation, including but not limited to any documents referring to or reflecting any investigation into any complaint made on behalf of Qiqiuia Young.
- 21. All documents referring to or reflecting any retaliation against Dr. Kim Rhoads for making any complaint regarding discrimination to Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University.
- 22. All documents referring to or reflecting any retaliation against Dr. Kim Rhoads for making any complaint regarding patient safety issues to Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University.
- 23. All documents Dr. Kim Rhoads submitted to an investigator during the investigation of her reports of discrimination and retaliation.
- 24. Any recordings Dr. Kim Rhoads has of any conversations with any investigator who conducted an investigation into her reports of discrimination and retaliation.
- 25. Any documents Dr. Kim Rhoads received in conclusion to the investigation into her reports of discrimination and retaliation.
- 26. Any transcriptions of any recordings of conversations Dr. Kim Rhoads had with any investigator who conducted an investigation into her reports of discrimination and retaliation.
- 27. All documents referring to, reflecting, or comprising any complaint Dr. Kim Rhoads made to Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University regarding any patient safety concern, including but not limited to any document referring to or reflecting any complaint regarding risk of infection to patients.

28. All documents referring to, reflecting, or comprising any complaint Dr. Kim Rhoads made to Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University regarding any employee safety concern, including but not limited to any document referring to or reflecting any complaint regarding risk of infection to employees.

- 29. All documents referring to, reflecting, or comprising any communication between Dr. Kim Rhoads and any Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University Patient Safety Consultant, including but not limited to Shelly Arthofer, regarding any report concerning any patient safety concern to Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University (including but not limited to any document reflecting Stanford University's history of punitive responses to such reports).
- 30. All documents referring to, reflecting, or comprising any report made by Dr. Gilbert Chu to Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University on behalf of Dr. Kim Rhoads regarding discrimination and/or retaliation, including but not limited to any report made to John Hennessey, John Etchemendy, and/or Angeline Covey, Esq.
- 31. All documents referring to, reflecting, or comprising any report made by Dr. Gilbert Chu to Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University on behalf of Qiqiuia Young regarding discrimination and/or retaliation, including but not limited to any report made to John Hennessey, John Etchemendy, and/or Angeline Covey, Esq.
- 32. All documents referring to, reflecting, or comprising communications involving Angeline Covey, Esq.
- 33. All documents referring to or reflecting communications regarding any mention of "bushmeat" by Dr. Brendan Visser, including emails from Dr. Visser referring to or reflecting any mention of "bushmeat" by him.
- 34. All documents referring to or reflecting the decision by Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University to move the Cancer Center Pelvic Floor Clinic to Redwood City, including but not limited to any document referring to or reflecting the timing of that decision

35. All documents referring to, reflecting, or comprising any "climate survey" conducted by Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University, including but not limited to any "climate survey" conducted by Stanford Health Care and/or Stanford University in response to any report made by Dr. Gilbert Chu concerning discrimination against Dr. Kim Rhoads and/or Qiqiuia Young.



From:

Donna McCurdy < DMcCurdy@sheppardmullin.com>

Sent:

Thursday, November 09, 2017 4:35 PM

To:

Lara Villarreal Hutner

Cc:

Tracey Kennedy; Morgan Forsey; Nora Stilestein; Natasha Domek

Subject:

Young v. Stanford - Letter from Tracey Kennedy

Attachments:

2017-11-09 Letter to Hutner from Kennedy re Representation (Young v. Stanford).PDF

Dear Ms. Hutner.

Attached please find a letter from Ms. Kennedy dated today in connection with the Young matter. A hard copy will follow in the mail.

Regards,

Donna

Donna McCurdy Legal Secretary to:

Charles F. Barker Tracey A. Kennedy Daniel J. McQueen Matthew A. Tobias Brett D. Young

213.617.5523 | direct DMcCurdy@sheppardmullin.com

SheppardMullin

Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP 333 South Hope Street, 43rd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071-1422 213.620.1780 | main www.sheppardmullin.com

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SheppardMullin

November 9, 2017

Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP 333 South Hope Street, 43rd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071-1422 213.620.1780 main 213.620.1398 main fax www.sheppardmullin.com

213.617.4249 direct tkennedy@sheppardmullin.com

File Number: 0100-092724

VIA E-MAIL AND U.S. MAIL

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq.
Villarreal Hutner PC
575 Market Street, 17th Floor
San Francisco, California 94105
E-Mail: LHutner@vhattomeys.com

Re: Young v. Stanford

Alameda County Superior Court Case No. RG17877051

Ms. Hutner:

As you know, my firm has been retained as counsel in the above-referenced matter. Despite my voicemails and emails, we have yet to connect to discuss this case. As you are aware, I am in trial, but have time tomorrow for a call. Please let me know your availability.

In advance of our call, I want to let you know that we have received the notices of deposition from your office, including the recent deposition subpoena for Ms. Rhoads to appear and produce documents on November 27, 2017, which is the first business day after the Thanksgiving holiday. Please note, my client and I are unavailable on the date that you have unilaterally selected without meeting and conferring in advance. We are happy to discuss alternative dates that work for everyone who must attend. While we intend to serve formal objections under separate cover, it would be more efficient for all concerned to simply move the date and address objections in due course.

Further, in light of the pending motion to transfer venue, and the resulting suspension of the Court's jurisdiction, we recommend a temporary stay on discovery until the venue motion is decided. Once the appropriate venue is determined, we can meet and confer regarding discovery, and the litigation can move forward in the normal course. Meanwhile, the stay allows all parties to conserve resources. The motion for change of venue hearing, presently set for November 28, 2017, will likely be rescheduled once the case is assigned to a new judge. Therefore, we suggest a stipulated stay on discovery until two weeks after the new hearing date.

I look forward to speaking with you tomorrow.

Sincerely.

Tracey A. Kennedy

for SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP

SMRH:484682177,1

From:

Lara Villarreal Hutner

Sent:

Monday, November 13, 2017 12:17 PM

To:

'Donna McCurdy'

Cc:

Tracey Kennedy; Morgan Forsey; Nora Stilestein; Natasha Domek; Christopher Whelan

(Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com); Lauren Cooper; Timothy Reed

Subject:

RE: Young v. Stanford - Letter from Tracey Kennedy

Hi Donna.

Thank you for your email. Unfortunately, I did not see Tracey's letter until today. I have added you to my "safe senders" list, but in the future, would you please cc the other attorneys on the case, who I have cc'd here?

Thanks very much,

Lara

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq. Villarreal Hutner PC 575 Market Street, 17th Floor San Francisco, California 94105 Direct 415.632.4101 Fax 415.512.7674 www.vhattorneys.com

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From:

Lara Villarreal Hutner

Sent:

Monday, November 13, 2017 5:46 PM

To:

Tracey Kennedy (TKennedy@sheppardmullin.com); Morgan Forsey

(mforsey@sheppardmullin.com); Nora Stilestein; Natasha Domek; Michael Bruno; Alyson

Cabrera (acabrera@grsm.com); png@grsm.com

Cc:

Christopher Whelan (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com); Lauren Cooper; Timothy Reed

Subject:

Young v. Stanford et al.

Attachments:

Young-Stanford, LVH November 13, 2017 Letter to Tracey Kennedy.pdf

Counsel:

Please see my attached correspondence.

Best regards,

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq.
Villarreal Hutner PC
575 Market Street, 17th Floor
San Francisco, California 94105
Direct 415.632.4101 Fax 415.512.7674
www.vhattorneys.com

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575 Market Street, Suite 1700 San Francisco, California 94105 Phone 415.543.4200 Fax 415.512.7674 www.VHAttorneys.com

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq. Writer's Direct Line: (415) 832-4101 Ihutner@vhattomeys.com

November 13, 2017

VIA E-MAIL AND U.S. MAIL

Tracey A. Kennedy, Esq.
Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP
333 South Hope Street, 43rd Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071-1422

Re:

Oiqiuia Young v. Stanford University, Stanford Health Care, Stanford Hospital and Clinics, and Chanrath Flores

Alameda County Superior Court Case No. RG17877051

Dear Tracey:

This is in response to your letter of November 9, 2017.

We sent an email to you and counsel for Gordon & Rees on Monday, November 6th requesting comments to Ms. Young's proposed protective order (that we sent to the attorneys at Gordon & Rees on Thursday, November 2nd) and further asking for clarification regarding whom we should be directing communications to, and we received zero response.

We appreciate that you were recently retained in this case, but Gordon & Rees has been representing Stanford in this matter for more than a year, and, by our count, there are now seven attorneys defending Stanford in this matter — including two partners at Gordon & Rees and two partners at Sheppard Mullin. Under other circumstances, we would not have an issue continuing the deposition of Dr. Rhoads. However, here, Stanford's motion to transfer venue put information about Dr. Rhoads and the evidence she has at issue and, because of Stanford's own negotiated terms with Dr. Rhoads, we cannot obtain information from Dr. Rhoads absent a deposition subpoena.

Given our new hearing date, Ms. Young has until November 27th to file her opposition to Stanford's motion to transfer venue, which is the same date we subpoenaed Dr. Rhoads for deposition. If your clients are willing to stipulate to a two-week continuance of the hearing on the motion to transfer venue, we would be willing to move Dr. Rhoads' deposition to a date later the week of November 27th – perhaps even November 28th, given that all parties

Tracey A. Kennedy, Esq. November 13, 2017 Page 2

should have that date available as, until this afternoon, November 28th was the date of the hearing on the motion to transfer venue.

We are not aware of any authority for the proposition that Stanford Health Care's motion to transfer venue results in "suspension of the Court's jurisdiction," particularly as defendant Chanrath Flores is a resident of Alameda County. Please provide the authority you rely on.

Finally, regarding your request to stay discovery: if defendants agree that a stay would not impact Ms. Young's priority both with respect to the depositions she has noticed and the discovery she has propounded, and if we are able to get a protective order in place by the end of the week, we would be amenable to discussing a thoughtful plan that incorporates a stay – but such a plan has to be negotiated and in place before we can agree to a stay. (And I am happy to negotiate with your partner, Morgan Forsey, given your trial schedule.)

Please let us know by close of business tomorrow if this sounds like a workable solution.

Very truly yours,

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq.

VILLARREAL HUTNER PC

From:

Morgan Forsey <mforsey@sheppardmullin.com>

Sent:

Tuesday, November 14, 2017 11:45 AM

To:

Lara Villarreal Hutner

Cc:

Christopher Whelan (Chris@WhelanLawOffices.com); Lauren Cooper; Timothy Reed; png@grsm.com; Tracey Kennedy; Nora Stilestein; Natasha Domek; Alyson Cabrera;

Michael Brunc

Subject:

Young v. Stanford et al.

Attachments:

Stanford (Young) Letter to L. Hutner (11-14-17).pdf

Lara,

I am sure we will connect by phone eventually. In the interim, please see the attached responding to your letter from yesterday.

If you have any questions or wish to discuss, feel free to give me a call.

Thanks, Morgan

Morgan Forsey 415.774.3254 | direct 415.403.6087 | direct fax mforsey@sheppardmullin.com | Bio

SheppardMullin

Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP Four Embarcadero Center, 17th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111-4109 415.434.9100 | main www.sheppardmullin.com

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Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP Four Embarcadero Center, 17th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111-4109 415.434.9100 main 415.434.3947 main fax www.sheppardmullin.com

415-774-3254 direct mforsey@sheppardmullin.com

File Number: 0100-092724

November 14, 2017

VIA E-MAIL AND U.S. MAIL

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq.
Villarreal Hutner PC
575 Market Street, 17th Floor
San Francisco, California 94105
E-Mail: LHutner@vhattorneys.com

Re: Young v. Stanford

Alameda County Superior Court Case No. RG17877051

Ms. Hutner:

Thank you for your letter last evening. We have discussed your proposal regarding a short stay of discovery with our clients and they are agreeable, subject to the clarifications below.

Specifically, if Ms. Young will agree to a stay of all discovery until the venue issue is decided, my clients will agree to the discovery priority you suggest. Here are our suggested terms for the discovery stay:

- If the court denies the motion to change venue, the stay will be lifted immediately upon issuance of the order. Responses to pending discovery will be due 2 weeks from the date the court issues the order on the motion, and previously noticed depositions may be rescheduled and re-noticed on mutually agreeable dates with priority remaining intact.
- 2. If the court grants the motion to change venue, the stay will be lifted upon Santa Clara County assigning this matter to a department. Responses to pending discovery will be due 2 weeks from the date the case is assigned, and previously noticed depositions may be rescheduled and re-noticed on mutually agreeable dates with priority remaining intact.
- 3. During the stay, neither side will propound new discovery.

While the stay is in place, we are happy to use the time to negotiate the terms of a protective order. Please note, even if we come to agreement on terms, we will not be able to have an order in place by the end of the week as you suggest. Until the venue issue is decided, we will not be able to obtain an order from the court. However, there is nothing preventing us from agreeing to terms and preparing a stipulation for filing once the case is assigned. Given the complicated issues surrounding patient health, and the anticipated requests for confidential business and employment information, having a comprehensive protective order in place is essential. Thank you for taking the first pass at the draft.

With respect to your request to continue the December 8, 2017 hearing date on the motion for change of venue, we are amenable to moving the date, but question whether that's necessary if we have a stay in place. Please let us know if you would like us to request a new date for the hearing and we can look for a date that works for everyone.

SheppardMullin

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq. November 14, 2017 Page 2

Please confirm by close of business tomorrow whether your client agrees to the stay as outlined above. If you have any questions, please feel free to give me a call or send an email.

Sincerely,

Morgan P. Forsey

for SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP

SMRH:484682177.1

Michelle Traina

From:

Michelle Traina

Sent:

Tuesday, November 14, 2017 5:01 PM

To:

'mforsey@sheppardmullin.com'

Cc:

'tkennedy@sheppardmullin.com'; 'nstilestein@sheppardmullin.com';

'ndomek@sheppardmullin.com'; 'mbruno@grsm.com'; 'acabrera@grsm.com';

'png@grsm.com'; 'chris@whelanlawoffices.com'; Lara Villarreal Hutner; Lauren Cooper;

Timothy Reed

Subject:

Young v. Stanford University, et al.

Attachments:

Young_Stanford - 11.14.17 Letter to Morgan Forsey with Protective Order.PDF

Dear Mr. Forsey:

On behalf of Lara Villarreal Hutner, attached please find correspondence with enclosure in the above-referenced matter. The original will follow via US Mail.

Please do not hesitate to contact me should you have any questions regarding the transmittal.

Thank you.

Michelle Traina Legal Assistant Villarreal Hutner PC 575 Market Street, Suite 1700 San Francisco, CA 94105

mtraina@vhattorneys.com

Direct: (415) 632-4114 | Fax: (415) 512-7674

STATEMENT OF CONFIDENTIALITY

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575 Market Street, Suite 1700 San Francisco, California 94105 Phone 415.543.4200 Fax 415.512.7674 www.VHAttorneys.com

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq. Writer's Direct Line: (415) 632-4101 lhutner@vhattorneys.com

November 14, 2017

VIA E-MAIL AND U.S. MAIL

Morgan P. Forsey, Esq.
Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP
4 Embarcadero Center, 17th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111-4109

Re:

Qiqiuia Young v. Stanford University, Stanford Health Care, Stanford Hospital and Clinics, and Chanrath Flores

Alameda County Superior Court Case No. RG17877051

Dear Morgan:

This is in response to your correspondence of this morning, November 14, 2017.

We appreciate your willingness to stipulate to a continuance on the hearing date for the motion to transfer venue; however, the purpose of the continuance is to allow for Dr. Rhoads' deposition to be rescheduled for the convenience of defendants to another date the week of November 27th (assuming that Dr. Rhoads and her counsel are available). As set forth in my November 13, 2017 correspondence, Stanford raised Dr. Rhoads as an issue in its motion to transfer venue, and per Stanford's negotiated terms with Dr. Rhoads, Ms. Young may only obtain evidence to oppose the motion from Dr. Rhoads via deposition subpoena.

Further, with respect to the protective order, given Sheppard Mullin's representation of Cedars-Sinai and Dignity Health (as well as manifold other hospitals and health care entities), and Gordon & Rees' representation of Stanford Health Care in numerous other matters, negotiating a protective order should not be time-intensive. It is understood that there will not be judicial approval of the protective order until the issue of the motion to transfer is settled; however, that should not be an impediment to the parties' negotiation and execution of a protective order, as the order can be submitted for signature as soon as the issue of the motion is resolved, which will allow defendants to comply with their document production requirements in response to previously propounded discovery.

Morgan P. Forsey, Esq. November 14, 2017 Page 2

Assuming we are able to execute a protective order by the end of this week, we propose the following:

- 1) Stipulating to a two-week continuance on the motion to transfer venue to allow for the deposition of Dr. Rhoads to be rescheduled to a date the week of November 27th that works for Ms. Young's and Stanford's counsel, or, in the alternative, stipulating to a two-week continuance of the motion to transfer venue, but limiting Dr. Rhoads' deposition to 1 1½ hours on November 27th to address issues specific to Ms. Young's opposition to the motion to transfer venue;
- 2) Stipulating to a stay on discovery pending the outcome of the motion to transfer venue as follows:
 - a) If the court denies the motion to change venue, the stay ceases immediately and (i) the protective order will be submitted immediately for the court's signature; (ii) responses and documents from all defendants will be due two weeks from the date the court issues the order on the motion and will include a privilege log; (iii) amended responses and documents from all deponents whose depositions were previously noticed will be due two weeks from the date the court issues the order on the motion and will include a privilege log; (iv) the previously noticed depositions of Martha Berrier, David Entwistle, Dr. Gilbert Chu, Chanrath Flores, and Dr. Kim Rhoads will be rescheduled and re-noticed/subpoenaed on mutually agreeable dates, the order of which is to be decided by Ms. Young and with Ms. Young's priority remaining intact such that no defendant-initiated/noticed deposition will occur until after all of the five (5) depositions that have been noticed/subpoenaed have been completed; and
 - b) If the court grants the motion to change venue, the stay will cease upon Santa Clara County assigning the matter to a department and (i) the protective order will be submitted immediately for the court's signature; (ii) responses and documents from all defendants will be due two weeks from the date the court issues the order on the motion and will include a privilege log; (iii) amended responses and documents from all deponents whose depositions were previously noticed will be due two weeks from the date the court issues the order on the motion and will include a privilege log; (iv) the previously noticed depositions of Martha Berrier, David Entwistle, Dr. Gilbert Chu, Chanrath Flores, and Dr. Kim Rhoads will be rescheduled and re-noticed/subpoenaed on mutually agreeable dates, the order of which is to be decided by Ms. Young and with Ms. Young's priority remaining intact such that no defendant-

Morgan P. Forsey, Esq. November 14, 2017 Page 3

initiated/noticed deposition will occur until after all of the five (5) depositions that have been noticed/subpoenaed have been completed.

3) During the stay, the parties will not propound new discovery.

Please let us know if this this sounds like a workable solution. Attached is the draft protective order that we sent to Gordon & Rees a couple of weeks ago, a version of which we have used in defending our joint client, Dignity Health.

Very truly yours,

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq.
VILLARREAL HUTNER PC

Enclosure

VILLARREAL HUTNER PC LARA VILLARREAL HUTNER, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 178639 E-Mail: lhutner@vhattorneys.com LAUREN M. COOPER, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 254580 E-Mail: lcooper@vhattorneys.com TIMOTHY L. REED, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 258034 E-Mail: treed@vhattorneys.com 575 Market Street, Suite 1700 San Francisco, California 94105 Telephone: 415.543.4200 / Facsimile: 415.512.7674 CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, INC. CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 080823 E-Mail: chris@whelanlawoffices.com 11246 Gold Express Drive, Suite 100 Gold River, California 95670 Telephone: 916.635.5577 / Facsimile: 916.635.9159 Attorneys for Plaintiff QIQIUIA YOUNG MICHAEL D. BRUNO, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 166805 E-Mail: mbruno@gordonrees.com ALYSON S. CABRERA, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 222717 E-Mail: acabrera@gordonrees.com PAMELA Y. NG, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 273036 E-Mail: png@gordonrees.com GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP **Embarcadero Center West** 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: 415.986.5900 / Facsimile: 415.986.8054 SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP 17 A LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING CORPORATIONS 18 TRACEY A. KENNEDY, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 150782 E-Mail: tkennedy@sheppardmullin.com NORA K. STILESTEIN, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 280692 E-Mail: nstilestein@sheppardmullin.com NATASHA L. DOMEK, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 314589 E-Mail: ndomek@sheppardmullin.com 333 South Hope Street, 43rd Floor Los Angeles, California 90071-1422 Telephone: 213.620-1780/Facsimile: 213.620.1398 23 MORGAN P. FORSEY, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 241207 E-Mail: mforsey@sheppardmullin.com 4 Embarcadero Center, 17th Floor San Francisco, California 94111-4109 Telephone: 415.434.9100/Facsimile: 415.434.3947 26 Attorneys for Defendants THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY (erroneously named as THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY), STANFORD HEALTH CARE, STANFORD HOSPITAL AND CLINICS, CHANRATH FLORES

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 2 COUNTY OF 3 QIQIUIA YOUNG, 5 Plaintiff, 6 THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY, STANFORD HEALTH CARE, STANFORD HOSPITAL AND CLINICS, CHANRATH FLORES CLINICS, CHANRATH FLORES and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, 10 Defendants. 11 12 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Case No. [PROPOSED] STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED INTO BY PLAINTIFF QIQIUIA YOUNG AND **DEFENDANTS BOARD OF TRUSTEES** OF THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY, STANFORD HEALTH CARE, STANFORD HOSPITAL AND

Complaint Filed: September 28, 2017 FAC Filed: October 10, 2017

Trial Date: None Set

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PROTECTIVE ORDER

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and among Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young, through her counsel on the one hand, and Defendants The Board of Trustees of The Leland Stanford Junior University (erroneously sued as The Leland Stanford Junior University), Stanford Health Care, Stanford Hospital and Clinics, Chanrath Flores, through their counsel on the other that:

The Parties shall exchange certain responsive data, documents, and information in the Discovery Process. Such data, documents, and information that a Party considers "Confidential" shall be conspicuously marked or identified as defined below, and subject to the restrictions of this Protective Order.

1. Parties.

Only the following persons are "Parties" to this action: Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young; and Defendants The Board of Trustees of The Leland Stanford Junior University (erroneously sued as The Leland Stanford Junior University), Stanford Health Care, Stanford Hospital and Clinics, (including all their officers, directors, and agents) and Chanrath Flores. Further Parties may be added to this action by stipulation or by order of the Court, in which case such Parties will be added to this Protective Order. For purposes of this Protective Order, the "Designating Party" is the party who produces documents and marks them as "Confidential" pursuant to this Protective Order. For purposes of this Protective Order, the "Receiving Party" is the party who receives documents marked as "Confidential" pursuant to this Protective Order.

2. Confidential Documents and Information.

- 2.1 A "Confidential Document" shall mean any document that bears the stamp or legend "Subject to Protective Order" or "Confidential," and is defined in the next paragraph and is entitled to confidentiality under established principles of law.
- 2.2 "Confidential Information," for guidance of the parties and any discovery referee or master appointed herein, is hereby found to be such documents, materials, items or information lawfully entitled to confidential treatment under existing California law, including:
 - 2.2.1 Information protected under the federal Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act and the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Cal. Civ. Code 2 §§ 56 et seq. 3 Information protected by the physician-patient privilege, Cal. Evid. Code §§ 2.2.2 990, 996, 1014. 4 5 Information relating to medical board proceedings, Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1157, 1157.5. 7 Financial information of third-parties or individuals as described in Valley 2.2.4 Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652 (1975); 9 2.2.5 Personal information as described in Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. 10 App. 3d 265 (1978); 11 Information relating to membership in religious and political associations (Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844 (1978)), personal financial data (Cobb v. Superior Court, 12 99 Cal. App. 3d 543 (1979)), personnel records (Board of Trustees v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. 13 App. 3d 516 (1981)), and intimate facts (Tylo v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. App. 4th 1379 (1997)); 14 2.2.7 Information otherwise protected by Article I, Section 1 of the California 15 16 Constitution. 17 2.2.8 Other confidential or proprietary information, including contracts between Defendants and any third-party. 18 19 2.3 For purposes of this protective order ("Protective Order"), the term "document" means all written, recorded, or graphic material, whether produced or created by a 20 21 party or another person, and whether produced pursuant to document request, subpoena, by 22 agreement, or otherwise. 23 Interrogatory answers, responses to requests for admissions, deposition 2.4 24 transcripts and exhibits, pleadings, motions, affidavits, and briefs that quote, summarize, or contain materials entitled to protection may be accorded status as a Confidential Document, but, to 25 26 the extent feasible, shall be prepared in such a manner that the confidential information is bound 27 separately from information that is not entitled to protection as a Confidential Document. 28 2.5 Any document or information mistakenly produced or disclosed without

designation as a Confidential Document may be subsequently designated by the producing party as "Confidential" at any time pursuant to the terms of this Protective Order without waiving the confidential nature of the document or information. In any such case, the designating party shall provide to the other party notice, either written notice or oral notice followed by written notice, within five (5) business days of the subsequent designation, as well as a copy of the document or information marked in accordance with this Protective Order.

3. Declassification of Confidential Status.

- 3.1 All Confidential Documents and Information shall be accorded confidential status pursuant to the terms of this Protective Order unless the parties formally agree in writing to the contrary or a determination is made by the Court as to confidential status and that determination has become final by expiration of the time period for which appellate review or intervention must be sought.
- 3.2 Should a Receiving Party object to the designation of Confidential Documents or Confidential Information, the Receiving Party shall provide the Designating Party with a written objection that lists by bates number and title of the documents or things which the Receiving Party seeks to have excluded from the scope of the Protective Order. Such written objection shall be delivered to the Designating Party within fourteen (14) days of the Receiving Party's receipt of the documents at issue. Within fourteen (14) days of its receipt of such objection (by mail, by telecopier or by hand-delivery), the Designating Party shall respond to the written objection with an explanation for the designation. The parties shall meet and confer in good faith to attempt to resolve the designation. Should the parties remain in disagreement over the designation, the Designating Party may file a motion with the Court seeking a determination that the designated documents are subject to the provisions of this Protective Order. At all times prior to an order from this Court removing a confidentiality designation, documents or information designated as Confidential shall remain so designated and be treated as such by the parties. This Order does not change or affect the burden by which the proponent of confidentiality must establish its entitlement to confidential or protected status for designated documents.
 - 3.3 The failure of a Designating Party to file a motion confirming a designation

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within 60 days of receipt or initial designation shall result in the subject document being subject to this Protective Order.

4. Non-Disclosure of Confidential Documents.

- 4.1 With the exception of those persons identified in Paragraph 5 below, no Confidential Document or Information may be disclosed to any person without the prior, written consent of the Designating Party, nor shall the Parties, their counsel of record, their staff, technical consultants and/or experts sell, offer, advertise, publicize or provide under any condition, Confidential Documents or Information to any entity or use Confidential Documents or Information or disclose them to anyone, for any purpose, not directly related to the conduct of this litigation.
- 4.2 All Confidential Documents shall be kept in secure facilities at the offices of persons qualified to have access thereto under Paragraph 5 below, and any person in possession of Confidential Documents under the provisions of this Protective Order shall maintain such materials in a secure and safe area and shall exercise the same standard of due and proper care with respect to the storage, custody and use of such materials as is exercised by that person with respect to his/its own confidential information.
- 4.3 No notes, lists, memoranda, index or compilation prepared based wholly or in part upon examination of Confidential Documents or Information shall be disseminated to anyone not authorized to have access to Confidential Documents or Information.

5. Permissible Disclosures.

Notwithstanding the terms of Paragraph 4 above, Confidential Documents may be disclosed to the following persons without the prior, written consent of the Designating party:

- 5.1 Counsel for the parties in this action, including, but not limited to, attorneys and employees of such counsel's law firms, to the extent reasonably necessary to render professional services in connection with this action;
- 5.2 Parties to this action, only to the extent necessary for such parties to see Confidential Documents for the purposes of this action;
 - 5.3 Third-party contractors (and their employees) involved in the organizing,

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filing, coding, converting, storing, or retrieving data or designing programs for handling data connected with this action, including the performance of such duties in relation to a computerized litigation support system;

- 5.4 Other persons not covered by Paragraphs 5.1 through 5.3 above, who are employed by a party or their attorneys of record to assist in the preparation of this action for trial, such as independent experts and consultants, and the employees of such experts and consultants.
- 5.5 Court officials involved in this action, including court reporters, persons operating video recording equipment at depositions, and any special master or referee appointed by the Court;
- 5.6 Witnesses at deposition and trial (if any Confidential Information will be disclosed in open court, the disclosing party shall first reasonably inform the opposing party, so that such opposing party may request that the disclosure be made *in camera*);
- 5.7 Any other person designated by the Court in the interest of justice, and on such terms that the Court may deem just and proper.

6. Acknowledgment of Protective Order.

Before any Confidential Document or Information may be disclosed to persons described in Paragraphs 5.2. through 5.7 above, each person to whom such Confidential Documents and Information are disclosed shall be provided with a copy of this Protective Order and shall sign a written certification in the form of the undertaking attached as Attachment A to this Stipulated Protective Order certifying the following:

- a. that s/he has read the Protective Order and understands its terms;
- b. that s/he understands that unauthorized disclosures of Confidential Documents constitute contempt of court; and
- c. that s/he consents to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by this Court with respect to any dispute concerning an alleged violation of this Protective Order.

Such written certifications shall be maintained by the disclosing party and, upon reasonable advance request by the Designating Party, shall be produced for inspection, provided that in no event shall the disclosing party be required to reveal information protected by the

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attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, or any other legally-recognized privilege of non-disclosure, including, but not limited to, the disclosure of the identity of the disclosing party's expert consultants who have not been identified as expert witnesses in this action.

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Use at Trial or Hearing.

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does not govern sealing records as defined in California Rules of Court, Rules 2.550-2.551 for submission to the court for trial or for adjudication, but governs other disclosures to third-parties

This Protective Order is to facilitate exchange of records and information in discovery. It

or disclosure of records for discovery motions and discovery proceedings. Filing records for trial or adjudication under seal is governed by California Rules of Court, Rules 2.550-2.551 which requires that the "party requesting that a record be filed under seal must file a noticed motion." In order to facilitate prompt exchange of records and information, however, this Protective Order imposes an interim stay on filing records in Court of thirty (30) days from the date of production of the records, during which time it is expected that the Designating Party shall make such motion under Rule 2.551 for those records for which Designating Party requests that court filings be made under seal. During the said thirty (30) days, however, the receiving party may provide the

Party must then serve a Notice of Intent to Protect within the said three (3) days and within ten (10) days file and serve by email a motion to have the Confidential Documents or Information filed under seal, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rules 2.550 and 2.551, in order to require those documents be sealed or filed under seal. If and when the Designating Party files such

Designating Party written notice by email service of three (3) business days of its intent to file

items designated as Confidential Documents or Information with the Court. The Designating

motion to have the Confidential Documents or Information filed under seal, and during the pendency of such motion, the receiving party will refrain from filing such materials or shall lodge

such materials with the Court under seal in a manner consistent with California Rules of Court, Rule. 2.551, until such time as the Court can conduct a hearing and determination on the

Designating Party's motion. If no Notice of Intent to Protect or motion is served after the said

notice, such documents may be used for any purpose and are exempt from the stay.

8. Non-termination.

- 8.1 At the conclusion of this litigation, all Confidential Documents shall be returned to counsel of record for the Designating Party. All notes, lists, memoranda, appendices or other writings that reveal Confidential Information shall be destroyed, except that only attorneys of record shall be entitled to retain pleadings, memoranda, declarations or affidavits, written responses to discovery requests, responses to request for admission, or deposition transcripts that contain or refer to any Confidential Information to the extent necessary to preserve a litigation file in this case. Confidential Information in such litigation files shall remain sealed and disclosed only in accordance with the terms of this Stipulation and Order.
- 8.2 All obligations and duties arising under this Protective Order shall survive the termination of this action and, in addition, shall be binding upon the Parties to this action, their successors and assigns (whether in whole or in part), affiliates, subsidiaries, their officers, agents, representatives and employees.
- 8.3 This Court shall retain jurisdiction indefinitely with respect to any dispute regarding the improper use of Confidential Documents or Information, to modify the terms of this Protective Order, or to enter further Orders respecting Confidential Information, as may be necessary.

9. Additional Provisions.

- 9.1 This Order shall not be construed as waiving any right to assert any defense or objection, including but not limited to the defense or objection to the discovery or production of data, documents, and information, and to the use, relevancy or admissibility at trial or at any hearing of any evidence. This Order also shall not be construed as waiving any claims of privacy, privilege, relevance, overbreadth, burdensomeness, or other grounds for not producing materials sought in this action, and access to such materials shall be only as otherwise provided by the discovery rules and other applicable law. Nothing in this Stipulated Protective Order shall be construed to be an admission against a party or to constitute evidence of any fact or issue in this action.
 - 9.2 If another court, an administrative agency, or tribunal or arbitrator

1	subpoenas or orders production of Confidential Documents or information contained therein,			
2	which a party or other person has obtained under this Protective Order, such party or person shall			
3	as soon as practicable and within five (5) business days notify the Designating Party and its/her			
4	counsel of such subpoena or order and shall provide a copy of such subpoena or order to the			
5	Designating Party by the most rapid means of transmission available.			
6	IT IS SO STIPULATED:			
7				
8	Dated: November, 2017	VILLARREAL HUTNER PC		
9		CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, INC.		
1Ò				
11		By A DA WILL A DDEAL MAINTING		
12		LARA VILLARREAL HUTNER CHRISTOPHER WHELAN		
13		Attorneys for Plaintiff		
14	·	QIQIUIA YOUNG		
15	Dated: November 2017	CORDON BEEG COLLEGE MANGERMANT TAR		
16	Dated: November, 2017	GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP SHEPPARD MULLIN LLP		
17				
18		Ву		
19				
20		Attorneys for Defendants		
21		THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY, STANFORD		
22		HEALTH CARE, STANFORD HOSPITAL AND CLINICS, and CHANRATH FLORES		
23		Oblivios, and Charva III PLORES		
24				
25				
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28				

EXHIBIT A

1

32946178

CONFIDENTIALITY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND AFFIRMATION

3	I acknowledge that I have read and understand the Stipulated Protective Order governing the					
4	confidentiality of data, documents, and information, which was entered into by and among					
5	Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young and The Board of Trustees of The Leland Stanford Junior University					
6	(erroneously sued as The Leland Stanford Junior University), Stanford Health Care, Stanford					
7	Hospital and Clinics, and Chanrath Flores, on, 2017, in the					
8	matter of QIQIUIA YOUNG V. THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY, ET AL.,					
9	Case Number, in the Superior Court of California, County of					
10	. I qualify under its provisions as a person who may have access to					
11	data, documents, and information deemed Confidential under the Stipulated Protective Order. I					
12	will abide by the terms and provisions set forth in the Stipulated Protective Order, understand					
13	that unauthorized disclosure of Confidential Documents constitutes contempt of Court, and					
14	subject myself to the personal jurisdiction of this Court to enforce its terms.					
15						
16	Date:					
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[PROPOSED] ORDER

The Court, having read and considered the [Proposed] Stipulated Protective Order regarding the protection of Confidential Information, finds good cause appearing in that discovery in this action will be facilitated and thereby,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulated Protective Order is entered in this action without prejudice to any motion for modification.

Dated:	, 2017	Ву	
			CLIDEDIOD COLIDE ILIDGE

From:

Morgan Forsey <mforsey@sheppardmullin.com>

Sent:

Friday, November 17, 2017 3:55 PM

To:

Lara Villarreal Hutner

Cc:

Tracey Kennedy; Nora Stilestein; Natasha Domek; mbruno@grsm.com;

acabrera@grsm.com; png@grsm.com; chris@whelanlawoffices.com; Lauren Cooper;

Timothy Reed; Michelle Traina; Morgan Forsey

Subject:

Re: Young v. Stanford University, et al.

Counsel,

We have reviewed your November 14, 2017 letter regarding a possible stay of discovery and the deposition of Dr. Rhoads, currently noticed for <u>November 27, 2017</u>. It appears the parties are at impasse regarding a stay on discovery, as we cannot agree to the conditions Plaintiff requires for the stipulation.

As for the deposition of Dr. Rhoads, even if the deposition were limited to 1 1/2 hours to obtain testimony limited to venue as you suggest, as we have stated multiple times, our clients are unavailable to attend the unilaterally noticed deposition of Dr. Rhoads on November 27, the first business day after the Thanksgiving holiday. Further, as you know, counsel is unavailable. Tracey is in trial and is not expected to be done by that date. So, even a shortened deposition will not work that day.

While it is unclear what testimony Dr. Rhoads can provide that might impact the motion to transfer venue, we may be willing to stipulate to certain facts in an effort to obviate the purported immediate need for the deposition. For example, if Plaintiff seeks to establish that Dr. Rhoads is a resident of Alameda County, we would be willing to stipulate to that fact. Please advise, what facts pertaining to venue Plaintiff hopes to obtain from Dr. Rhoads and perhaps this can be resolved without the need to burden Dr. Rhoads and everyone else with potentially two days of deposition.

Lastly, we are currently reviewing the draft protective order and will respond shortly. In the future, please refrain from referencing documents or forms used by "joint clients." I do not believe any of our clients would appreciate their documents or practices being referenced in separate litigation.

Thank you, Morgan

Sent from my iPhone

From:

Lara Villarreal Hutner

Sent:

Monday, November 20, 2017 8:12 AM

To:

Morgan Forsey

Cc:

Tracey Kennedy; Nora Stilestein; Natasha Domek; mbruno@grsm.com;

acabrera@grsm.com; png@grsm.com; chris@whelanlawoffices.com; Lauren Cooper;

Timothy Reed; Michelle Traina

Subject:

Re: Young v. Stanford University, et al.

Morgan,

Your clients filed a motion to transfer venue and for sanctions against me personally, so I'm sure how anyone came to have the impression that gathering evidence from Dr. Rhoads to oppose their motion would be a collaborative effort between the parties, or that we would be looking for Stanford's permission to obtain the same.

Having worked with Tracey when I was at Sheppard Mullin, I think it would be great if she could attend Dr. Rhoads' deposition (despite that any of the other 6 attorneys representing Stanford in this case could do so) and I have offered to move the deposition to November 28th - our prior hearing date to accommodate her schedule, as well as that of your clients. While it's inconceivable that none of defendants' 7 attorneys who had November 28th on their calendar last week as the date for the hearing still has that date available, I also offered to move the deposition to another date next week, if that worked for everyone. Those offers still stand, but, of course, only if the hearing is continued, as there there obvious can be no rescheduling of Dr. Rhoads' deposition from November 27th with our opposition due on the same date.

Please let us know when we can expect your comments on the protective order and please provide dates in December for the depositions that we noticed in October for Martha Berrier, David Entwistle, Dr. Gilbert Chu, and Chanrath Flores.

Look forward to hearing from you.

Best, Lara

Sent from my iPhone

From:

Tracey Kennedy < TKennedy@sheppardmullin.com>

Sent:

Monday, November 20, 2017 8:36 AM

To:

Lara Villarreal Hutner

Cc:

Morgan Forsey; Nora Stilestein; Natasha Domek; mbruno@grsm.com;

acabrera@grsm.com; png@grsm.com; chris@whelanlawoffices.com; Lauren Cooper;

Timothy Reed; Michelle Traina

Subject:

Re: Young v. Stanford University, et al.

Lara

I am still in trial and I hope to be done by next week. Let's talk as soon as I am done. I am sure we can work this out. We will need to get a mutually agreeable date and time for depositions and Work on a mutually agreeable discovery schedule.

Tracey, From iPhone

From:

Morgan Forsey <mforsey@sheppardmullin.com>

Sent:

Monday, November 20, 2017 12:13 PM

To:

Lara Villarreal Hutner

Cc:

Tracey Kennedy; Nora Stilestein; Natasha Domek; mbruno@grsm.com;

acabrera@grsm.com; png@grsm.com; chris@whelanlawoffices.com; Lauren Cooper;

Timothy Reed; Michelle Traina

Subject:

RE: Young v. Stanford University, et al.

Lara,

Although Dr. Rhoads deposition was noticed to take place on a date after Plaintiff's opposition to the motion for change of venue was originally due, our clients are willing to continue the hearing date on the motion to allow time for Plaintiff to take a short deposition of Dr. Rhoads limited to information pertaining to venue.

We are available December 4, 2017 starting at 11 am.

To accommodate Plaintiff's request that the deposition take place before her opposition is due, Defendants would request the Court hear the motion for change of venue on December 21 or 22, or mid-January depending upon the Court's availability.

This agreement is contingent on the following:

- 1. By close of business today, Plaintiff withdraw the pending subpoena and request for documents served on Dr. Rhoads in its entirety.
- 2. Plaintiff serve a new subpoena for 12/4/17 at 11 am limited solely to venue.
- 3. Dr. Rhoads' attorneys agreeing to produce her for a second deposition later in the case.

Please let us know if this agreement is acceptable.

Thank you,

Morgan Forsey 415.774.3254 | direct 415.403.6087 | direct fax mforsey@sheppardmullin.com | Bio

SheppardMullin

Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP Four Embarcadero Center, 17th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111-4109 415.434.9100 | main www.sheppardmullin.com

From:

Lauren Cooper

Sent:

Tuesday, November 21, 2017 4:14 PM

To:

Morgan Forsey; Lara Villarreal Hutner

Cc:

Tracey Kennedy; Nora Stilestein; Natasha Domek; mbruno@grsm.com;

acabrera@grsm.com; png@grsm.com; chris@whelanlawoffices.com; Timothy Reed;

Michelle Traina

Subject:

RE: Young v. Stanford University, et al.

Morgan,

Following up on my prior correspondence, the below terms are acceptable so long as the hearing date is continued before we withdraw the pending subpoena, and Dr. Rhoads' deposition is rescheduled to a date on which Dr. Rhoads and her counsel are available. Dr. Rhoads and her counsel are not available on December 4, but are available for deposition on December 8, as are we.

Please confirm that you will continue the hearing date before we withdraw the subpoena. Once we have confirmation that the hearing date has been continued, we will withdraw and reissue for a later date prior to Plaintiff's new opposition deadline.

Look forward to hearing from you.

Kind Regards, Lauren

Lauren M. Cooper, Esq.
Villarreal Hutner PC
575 Market Street, Suite 1700
San Francisco, California 94105
Telephone 415.632.4111 Fax 415.512.7674
lcooper@vhattorneys.com
www.vhattorneys.com

From:

Lara Villarreal Hutner

Sent:

Wednesday, November 22, 2017 1:16 PM

To:

Lauren Cooper; Morgan Forsey

Cc:

Tracey Kennedy; Nora Stilestein; Natasha Domek; mbruno@grsm.com;

acabrera@grsm.com; png@grsm.com; chris@whelanlawoffices.com; Timothy Reed;

Michelle Traina

Subject:

RE: Young v. Stanford University, et al.

Morgan,

We have not heard back from you in response to our offer to withdraw the subpoena for Dr. Rhoads' deposition currently set for Monday, November 27th on the condition that you continue the hearing on the motion to transfer venue and for sanctions. Please let us know if your client is willing to continue the hearing on the motion to transfer venue and for sanctions in order to allow the parties to reschedule Dr. Rhoads' deposition for a mutually convenient date in advance of the opposition being due, whether it is December 8 or some other date that works for everyone.

Thanks much, Lara

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq.
Villarreal Hutner PC
575 Market Street, 17th Floor
San Francisco, California 94105
Direct 415.632.4101 Fax 415.512.7674
www.vhattorneys.com

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From: Morgan Forsey <mforsey@sheppardmullin.com>

Sent: Wednesday, November 22, 2017 3:27 PM

Lara Villarreal Hutner; Lauren Cooper Cc: Tracey Kennedy; Nora Stilestein; Natasha Domek; mbruno@grsm.com;

acabrera@grsm.com; png@grsm.com; chris@whelanlawoffices.com; Timothy Reed;

Michelle Traina

Subject: RE: Young v. Stanford University, et al.

Lara,

To:

December 8, 2017 does not work on our end. I have not been able to reach consensus on any other options – as not everyone has been available since yesterday afternoon to review and discuss this last minute proposal.

At this point, we will have to maintain the hearing date for the change of venue.

Thanks. Morgan

Morgan Forsey 415.774.3254 | direct 415.403.6087 | direct fax mforsey@sheppardmullin.com | Bio

SheppardMullin

Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP Four Embarcadero Center, 17th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111-4109 415.434.9100 | main www.sheppardmullin.com

From:

Lara Villarreal Hutner

Sent:

Wednesday, November 22, 2017 4:36 PM

To:

'Morgan Forsey'; Lauren Cooper

Cc:

Tracey Kennedy; Nora Stilestein; Natasha Domek; mbruno@grsm.com;

acabrera@grsm.com; png@grsm.com; chris@whelanlawoffices.com; Timothy Reed;

Michelle Traina

Subject:

RE: Young v. Stanford University, et al.

Morgan,

Based on your motion to quash that my co-counsel received at 4:15 p.m. (and that I have yet to receive), this is to confirm that: 1) you are preventing the deposition of Dr. Rhoads on Monday, November 27th, the date our opposition to the motion to transfer venue and for sanctions is due; and 2) you are refusing to continue the hearing on the motion.

In light of the above, I am following up on your offer to stipulate to basic facts regarding Dr. Rhoads that are relevant to venue. I will be preparing the stipulation and will get it to you shortly.

Best, Lara

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq. Villarreal Hutner PC 575 Market Street, 17th Floor San Francisco, California 94105 Direct 415.632.4101 Fax 415.512.7674 www.vhattorneys.com

This email may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient or authorized to receive for the recipient, please contact me by reply email and delete all copies of this message.

To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. federal tax advice contained in this document (including any attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein.

Lara Villarreal Hutner

From: Morgan Forsey <mforsey@sheppardmullin.com>

Sent: Wednesday, November 22, 2017 4:38 PM

To: Lara Villarreal Hutner; Lauren Cooper; Timothy Reed; Michelle Traina

Cc: Tracey Kennedy; Nora Stilestein; Natasha Domek; mbruno@grsm.com;

acabrera@grsm.com; png@grsm.com; chris@whelanlawoffices.com

Subject: Young v. The Leland Stanford Junior University, et al.

Attachments: Covey Declaration.pdf; Kennedy Declaration.pdf; Separate Statement iso Motion to

Quash.pdf; Objections to Notice of Depo of Rhoads.pdf; Proposed Order re Motion to Quash.pdf; Notice of Motion and Motion to Quash.pdf; Declaration of Morgan Forsey

iso Motion to quash.pdf

To the Villarreal Hutner Firm:

Attached are copies of documents that we attempted to serve on your office today during business hours (at approximate 3:15 pm). The security guard at your building informed the server that your offices were "closed" (we received no notice of unavailability). The guard would not let the server into the building to leave the documents at your office, or at the office door. The guard informed the server there was no mailbox nor mailroom and that he would throw the papers "in the garbage" if the server left them at the desk. Upon receipt, we will forward a declaration from the server. Pursuant to CCP section 1011(a) you will receive these documents by mail.

While not required to do so, we are providing courtesy copies of Defendants' motion to quash and objections to the subpoena of Dr. Rhoads. Pursuant to CCP section 2015.410(c) the deposition of Dr. Rhoads is stayed pending a decision on the motion.

Morgan Forsey 415.774.3254 | direct 415.403.6087 | direct fax mforsey@sheppardmullin.com | Bio

SheppardMullin

Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP Four Embarcadero Center, 17th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111-4109 415.434.9100 | main www.sheppardmullin.com Note: All attachments to this email were filed with the Court on 11/22/2017. They have been omitted from this exhibit for space considerations.

Lara Villarreal Hutner

From:

Lara Villarreal Hutner

Sent:

Wednesday, November 22, 2017 5:21 PM

To:

'Morgan Forsey'; Lauren Cooper

Cc:

'Tracey Kennedy'; 'Nora Stilestein'; 'Natasha Domek'; 'mbruno@grsm.com';

'acabrera@grsm.com'; 'png@grsm.com'; 'chris@whelanlawoffices.com'; Timothy Reed;

Subject:

RE: Young v. Stanford University, et al.

Attachments:

2946860_1.DOCX

Morgan,

As referenced below, attached is the Stipulation regarding information from and about Dr. Rhoads relevant to Defendants' motion to transfer venue and for sanctions.

Please let us know by close of business Friday, November 24, 2017 if your clients will stipulate to these basic facts.

Best regards,

Lara

Lara Villarreal Hutner, Esq. Villarreal Hutner PC 575 Market Street, 17th Floor San Francisco, California 94105 Direct 415.632.4101 Fax 415.512.7674

www.vhattorneys.com

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To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. federal tax advice contained in this document (including any attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein.

1	VILLARREAL HUTNER PC LARA VILLARREAL HUTNER, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 178639
2	E-Mail: lhutner@vhattorneys.com LAUREN M. COOPER, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 254580
3	E-Mail: lcooper@vhattorneys.com
4	TIMOTHY L. REED, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 258034 E-Mail: treed@vhattorneys.com
5	San Francisco, California 94105
6	Telephone: 415.543.4200 / Facsimile: 415.512.7674
7	CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, INC. CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 080823
8	E-Mail: chris@whelanlawoffices.com 11246 Gold Express Drive, Suite 100
9	Gold River, California 95670 Telephone: 916.635.5577 / Facsimile: 916.635.9159
10	Attorneys for Plaintiff QIQIUIA YOUNG
11	SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
12	A Limited Liability Partnership Including Professional Corporations
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14	NORA K. STILESTEIN, Cal. Bar No. 280692 333 South Hope Street, 43 rd Floor
15	Los Angeles, California 90071-1422 Telephone: 213.620.1780; Facsimile: 213.620.1398
16	MORGAN P. FORSEY, Cal. Bar No. 241207
17	Four Embarcadero Center, 17 th Floor San Francisco, California 94111-4109
18	Telephone: 415.434.9100; Facsimile: 415.434.3947
19	MICHAEL D. BRUNO, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 166805 E-Mail: mbruno@gordonrees.com
20	ALYSON S. CABRERA, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 222717 E-Mail: acabrera@gordonrees.com
21	PAMELA Y. NG, ESQ., Cal. Bar No. 273036 E-Mail: png@gordonrees.com
22	GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP Embarcadero Center West
23	275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111
24	Telephone: 415.986.5900 / Facsimile: 415.986.8054
25	Attorneys for Defendants THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY,
26	STANFORD HEALTH CARE AND CHANRATH FLORES
7	
8	

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

RENE C. DAVIDSON COURTHOUSE

QIQIUIA YOUNG,

Plaintiff,

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THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR
UNIVERSITY, STANFORD HEALTH
CARE, STANFORD HOSPITAL AND
CLINICS, CHANRATH FLORES and DOES
1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. RG17877051

STIPULATION REGARDING DR. KIM RHOADS

Complaint Filed: September 28, 2017

FAC Filed:

October 10, 2017

Trial Date:

None Set

2021222324252627

PROTECTIVE ORDER

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and among Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young, through her counsel on the one hand, and Defendants The Leland Stanford Junior University, Stanford Health Care, and Chanrath Flores, through their counsel on the other that:

- 1) Dr. Kim Rhoads was the head of Stanford Health Care's Pelvic Floor Clinic during Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young's employment until about April of 2016;
- Dr. Rhoads recommended Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young for promotion to the position
 Patient Testing Technician III in the Pelvic Floor Clinic.
- During the time that Dr. Rhoads was the head of the Pelvic Floor Clinic,
 Dr. Rhoads received and forwarded complaints by Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young of race discrimination, retaliation, and patient safety issues.
- 4) As a result, Dr. Rhoads made complaints of race discrimination, retaliation, and patient safety issues on behalf of Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young to Stanford Health Care's management.
- 5) Dr. Rhoads further made complaints of race discrimination and retaliation on her own behalf.
- As a result of Dr. Rhoads' complaints on her own behalf and on behalf of Plaintiff
 Qiqiuia Young, Dr. Rhoads was interviewed by a third party investigator hired by
 Stanford, Terry Roemer, for many hours, and Dr. Rhoads provided Terry Roemer
 with numerous related documents.
- 7) Dr. Rhoads further submitted a complaint to the Joint Commission based in part on patient safety issues reported to her by Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young.
- Dr. Rhoads maintains documents relevant to her report to the Joint Commission as well as documents relevant to Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young's claims of race discrimination, retaliation, and patient safety at her home in Oakland, California, County of Alameda.

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1	IT IS SO STIPULATED:
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3	Dated: November, 2017 VILLARREAL HUTNER PC
4	CHRISTOPHER H. WHELAN, INC.
5	
6	Ву
7	LARA VILLARREAL HUTNER CHRISTOPHER WHELAN
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff
9	QIQIUIA YOUNG
10	
11	Dated: November, 2017 SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
12	·
13	Ву
14	MORGAN FORSEY
15	Attorneys for Defendants
16	THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR
17	UNIVERSITY, STANFORD HEALTH CARE AND CHANRATH FLORES
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Full Name

Address

County ALAMEDA Phone (510)

RHOADS, KIM DIANE

OAKLAND, CA 94618-1841 ALAMEDA COUNTY

ADDITIONAL PERSONAL INFORMATION

SSN

DOB

Gender

LexiD(sm)

Email

Name Variations

- 1: FELDER, KIM D
- 2: FELDER, KIM DIANE
- 3: FELDER, RHOADS K
- 4: FELDER, RHOADS KIM



Public Records: Comprehensive Person Report

Terms:

first-name(cindy) last-name(deporte) state(CA) radius(30)

No. Full Name

Address/Phone

<u>SSN</u>

DEPORTE, CINDY L
DEPORTE, CYNTHIA
DEPORTE, CYNTHIA L
DEPORTE, CYNTHIA LYNN

FREMONT, CA 94536-2823 ALAMEDA COUNTY (10/1987-Current)



1 OF 1 RECORD(S)

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Date: 10/14/2017

Full Name GIZAW, ESTEDAR G

Address

County ALAMEDA

Phone (510)

OAKLAND, CA 94611-1830 ALAMEDA COUNTY

ADDITIONAL PERSONAL INFORMATION

Gender

LexID(sm)

Email

ESTEDAR, GIZAM



1 OF 1 RECORD(S)

FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

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Date:10/14/2017

Full Name Address
SUGUITAN, WINNIE RAMIL

County ALAMEDA Phone (510)

HAYWARD, CA 94544-3511 ALAMEDA COUNTY

ADDITIONAL PERSONAL INFORMATION

SSN

DOB

Gender

LexID(sm)

Email

Name Variations

1: SUGUITAN, R V

2: SUGUITAN, WINNIE

3: SUGUITAN, WINNIE R

4: SUGUITAN, WINNIE RAMIL

5: SUGUTAN, WINNIE

6: WINNIE, SUGUITAN



Public Records: Comprehensive Person Report

Terms:

first-name(Madonna) last-name(Paulin) state(CA) radius(30)

Find:

madonna

PAULIN, MADONNA HEBRON

(Gender: Female)

	maarma	•	
<u>No.</u>	Full Name	Address/Phone	SSN
1.	HEBRONPAULIN, MADONNA CHION		
	PAULIN, MADONNA	UNION CITY, CA 94587-1808	
	PAULIN, MADONNA C	ALAMEDA COUNTY	
	PAULIN, MADONNA H	(02/2007-Current)	· ·

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OAKLAND, CA 94603-2640 ALAMEDA COUNTY

ALAMEDA COUNT (12/2014-Current) <u>SSN</u>

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LILLARD, LEAH (Gender: Female)

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16	QIQIUIA YOUNG,	Case No. RG17877051				
17	Plaintiff,	DECLARATION OF				
18	v.	CYNTHIA DEPORTE				
19	THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR					
20	UNIVERSITY, STANFORD HEALTH CARE, STANFORD HOSPITAL AND					
21	CLINICS, CHANRATH FLORES, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,	. ,				
22	Defendants.					
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DECLARATION OF CYNTHIA DEPORTE

Case No. RG17877051

1	
1	I, Cynthia Deporte, declare:
2	1. I am over 18 years of age and I make this declaration based upon personal knowledge.
3	If called as a witness, I could and would testify competently to the facts set forth below.
4	2. I am not a party to this lawsuit, and I am not an employee of Stanford Health Care or
5	Stanford University.
6	3. Attending a trial in this case in Alameda County would be convenient for me, as I live
7	in Alameda County.
. 8	4. I am the prior Director of Stanford's Cancer Center in Palo Alto. I have a Bachelor of
9	Science (B.S.) in Nursing and a Master of Science (M.S) in Nursing Administration, and I worked for
10	Stanford for over 25 years. If I am called to testify at trial in this lawsuit, I will testify that I was
11	brought to the Stanford Cancer Center as its Director in order to develop processes and protocols and
12	to stabilize the work environment, including identifying areas of opportunity for improvement and
13	developing proper onboarding/cross-training protocol. I also will testify to a number of patient safety
14	issues that I became aware of while Qiqiuia Young worked in the Cancer Center that resulted from
15	subsequent management not following the onboarding/cross-training protocol I developed, including
16	with regard to the Cancer Center crash cart not being properly checked.
17	
18	I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is
19	true and correct.
20	
21	Dated: November, 2017
22	
23	Cynthia Deporte
24	
25	
26	
27	



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Jul 19, 2013, 6:34am PDT

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
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Case No. RG17877051

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PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER

12946890

VENUE AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS

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Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young ("Plaintiff") opposes Stanford Health Care's ("Stanford Health Care" or "Stanford") motion to transfer venue and for sanctions. Moreover, as the motion is wholly without merit, and Stanford has thwarted Plaintiff's efforts to obtain and submit evidence to oppose the motion, Plaintiff further seeks sanctions. Stanford's transparent goal here is to force Plaintiff to litigate her case in Stanford's "home court" after Stanford poisoned the jury pool: the day after Plaintiff filed her lawsuit, Stanford Health Care's CEO David Entwistle sent an email to potentially 20,000 Stanford employees in Santa Clara County - *i.e.*, potential Santa Clara jurors - alerting them to this lawsuit and characterizing Plaintiff as a liar and her claims as "highly exaggerated."

Plaintiff filed this action in Alameda County because she had every right to do so. This forum is proper on several statutory grounds – including under the Code of Civil Procedure and the Government Code – and Plaintiff properly exercised her right to choose it. Stanford's contention that Plaintiff is improperly "forum shopping" by choosing a venue she has a right to choose under all applicable law, and where she believes she is most likely to have a fair and impartial trial, is absurd. It is Stanford that is improperly "forum shopping" by seeking transfer to the County where it exercises vast power and influence, despite any legal support for its position, and despite its utter failure to proffer admissible evidence to support its motion. Stanford's main argument – that the FEHA venue provision trumps all other applicable venue provisions – is meritless. Not only does it ignore pertinent facts and allegations in the Complaint, it is unsupported by any law and misrepresents what the caselaw says. Such a blatant attempt to mislead the Court to the prejudice of Plaintiff's rights is sanctionable. Moreover, Stanford failed to satisfy its burden on proving "convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice," require transfer; in contrast, Plaintiff's evidence demonstrates that a transfer of venue would fly in the face of the convenience witnesses and the ends of justice. Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court deny this meritless motion and award sanctions against Stanford for having brought it.

I. Summary of facts, allegations and evidence relevant to this motion.

A. Undisputed matters.

It is undisputed that: 1) Plaintiff asserts causes of action against an individual defendant,
Chanrath Flores, she is properly joined as a defendant, and she is an Alameda County resident;

6 Case No. RG17877051

2) Plaintiff's claims for statutory penalties arose in Alameda County; 3) Stanford Health Care is a California corporation (*see* Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Exh. A); and 4) Plaintiff has asserted several causes of action against Stanford Health Care that arose in Alameda County. Further, the undisputed evidence shows that records pertinent to Plaintiff's causes of action under FEHA are maintained and administered in two locations in Alameda County.

B. Stanford's "evidence," and the lack thereof, and its CEO's poisoning of the Santa Clara County jury pool.

The woefully inadequate evidence Stanford relies on is the Harris Declaration. Relating to the issue of witness convenience, Ms. Harris proffers *no evidence* identifying where the witnesses *reside* (the pertinent question when asserting convenience of witnesses) and further proffers no evidence showing *when* any of the witnesses works, whether and how any of them would be *inconvenienced* by attending trial in Alameda County. Moreover, there is no evidence, as there must be, of the *substance* of any witness' testimony, nor of whether it would be favorable to Stanford.

Moreover, in claiming that the "ends of justice" would be served by transferring the case to Santa Clara County, Stanford proffers *no evidence at all*; rather, Ms. Harris simply asserts that Stanford Health Care's administrative policies and procedures, complaints and investigations, and personnel files are located in Santa Clara County. (Harris Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.)

Stanford's only other "evidence" is the subject of its request for judicial notice, and a declaration of its lawyer; however, these do not relate to any material issue. As is obvious from the Complaint, Plaintiff does not have a claim against Ms. Flores under FEHA, nor does she have to for venue to be proper against Ms. Flores, an Alameda County resident. Stanford's attorney's declaration then supplies correspondence among counsel, demonstrating that Stanford has knowingly taken positions herein that are unsupported by law. Stanford's attorney also proffers a media article in support of its frivolous attempt to spin as improper "forum shopping" Plaintiff's

¹ Concurrently herewith, Plaintiff is filing objections to Stanford's evidence, and respectfully requests that the Court sustain those objections and disregard Stanford's purported evidence entirely.

(i) exercise of her right to choose from any proper venue fully available to her pursuant to applicable law, and (ii) her choice, already proven wise, not to select venue in Santa Clara County because of the very real and unfair bias she is likely to suffer there in light of Stanford's overwhelming influence in and ties to that community. Regardless, the proffered article and its characterization of a statement allegedly made by Plaintiff's attorney – which is not even a quote – is inadmissible hearsay, and is immaterial: afforded the choice under applicable law to sue elsewhere, only a fool would needlessly choose to sue Stanford on its "home court," where its vast power and influence provide its CEO with the audacity to publically retaliate against an employee and malign her credibility, thereby poisoning the jury pool in Santa Clara County, where his email reached the greatest number of Stanford employees. (Decl. of Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young ¶ 18, Ex A.)

C. Plaintiff's substantial evidence demonstrating venue is proper and the ends of justice demand this action remain in Alameda County, particularly in light of Stanford's willful suppression of evidence at the outset of litigation.

Plaintiff's evidence shows conclusively that venue for this action is proper in Alameda County – including under the FEHA provisions – and that the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice demand that this action remain before this Court. (*See* Decls. of Plaintiff Qiqiuia Young, Neelam Sharma, Salma Morales, Shaniqua Geegan, and Lara Villarreal Hutner, *generally*.)

The last business day before Plaintiff was to depose Dr. Kim Rhoads – a key witness whom Stanford (wrongly and baselessly) claims lacks evidence of Plaintiff's FEHA claims at her place of residence in Alameda County – to obtain evidence to oppose this motion, Stanford filed a frivolous motion to quash the deposition subpoena to prevent Plaintiff from obtaining evidence to refute its patently wrong assertions. And Stanford did so after offering to continue the hearing on this motion such that the deposition could occur at a time more convenient *for Stanford*. Then, with no warning, at 3:30 p.m. the day before Thanksgiving, Stanford reneged on its offer, and further failed to even mention that it had filed a surreptitious motion to quash the deposition subpoena in order to suppress evidence. The sense of impunity evidenced by this type of chicanery underscores that the ends of justice require that Stanford not be allowed to transfer this case to Santa Clara County where it wields even more power and influence. (Hutner Decl. ¶¶ 6-7, Exh. E.)

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II. Plaintiff was entitled to choose, and has chosen, a proper forum.

"There is a presumption that the county in which the plaintiff chose to file the action is the proper county." Battaglia Enters., Inc. v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 4th 309, 313-14 (2013); Shida v. Japan Food Corp., 185 Cal. App.2d 443, 447 (1960) (plaintiff's choice of venue "is regarded as presumptively correct"); Smith v. Stanford Research Institute, 212 Cal. App. 2d 750, 754 (1963). "The burden rests on the party seeking a change of venue to defeat the plaintiff's presumptively correct choice of court." Battaglia Enters., 215 Cal.App.4th at 314. As set forth in Fontaine v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 4th 830, 836 (2009) (citations omitted) (emphasis added):

The court may, on timely motion, order transfer of an action "[w]hen the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court." The moving party must overcome the presumption that the plaintiff has selected the proper venue. Thus, "[i]t is the moving defendant's burden to demonstrate that the plaintiff's venue selection is not proper under any of the statutory grounds." In opposing the motion to change venue, "[t]he plaintiff may bolster his or her choice of venue with counter affidavits consistent with the complaint's theory of the type of action but amplifying the allegations relied upon for venue."

Venue may be proper, as it is here, in more than one county; it depends on the facts. See Battaglia Enters., 215 Cal. App. 4th at 313. When that is so, it is the plaintiff's prerogative to select the venue for the case from all available alternatives. "[W]hen multiple venues are proper pursuant to the legislature's determination, the plaintiff's choice of venue in filing the lawsuit would prevail." *Id.* at 314. Here, Plaintiff's choice of venue in Alameda County is proper under several statutes.

Α. This venue is proper pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 395(a).

Section 395(a) sets forth the general venue provision under California law: "Except as otherwise provided by law and subject to the power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided in this title, the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action."

Defendant Flores is an Alameda County resident. (FAC ¶ 40.) Therefore, venue in Alameda County is proper pursuant to section 395(a), unless an exception applies; i.e., unless it is "otherwise provided by law" that venue is not proper in the county where Ms. Flores resides. See generally Arntz Builders v. Superior Court, 122 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1203-04 (2004).

///

Stanford argues that the FEHA venue provision is an exception to the general rule in this case. Stanford is wrong. While the FEHA venue provision can be a basis to transfer venue in *some* cases, it is not an exception applicable in *this* case – as set forth *infra* – because a defendant does not have such a right to transfer under FEHA where a plaintiff properly files a lawsuit asserting claims arising from facts not pertaining to the FEHA claims, against another defendant, in the county of that defendant's residence. In short, the FEHA venue provisions do not trump the Code of Civil Procedure; therefore venue is proper in Alameda County for this entire action under section 395(a).

B. This venue also is proper pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 393.

Section 393 sets forth a special venue provision, as follows: "Subject to the power of the court to transfer actions and proceedings as provided in this title, the county in which the cause, or some part of the cause, arose, is the proper county for the trial of the following actions: (a) For the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture imposed by statute. . . ." And, unlike section 395(a), section 393 is not subject to exceptions "as otherwise provided by law." The sole exception to section 393 is specifically identified in the statute, and as it concerns a penalty or forfeiture relating to "an offense committed on a lake, river, or other stream of water, situated in two or more counties," is irrelevant.

In this action, Plaintiff seeks the recovery of penalties imposed by statute. (FAC ¶¶ 280-287, 300-303, 317-318, 323-325; see Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51.7, 52; Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226, 226.7, 558.)

Plaintiff's causes of action for recovery of these statutory penalties arose where the injury occurred which gives rise to those penalties: in Alameda County. (FAC ¶¶ 50, 299, 309; Young Decl. ¶ 3; see Mission Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 921, 929 (1982); Sea World, Inc. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.App.3d 100, 104 (1970); California State Parks Foundation v. Superior Court, 150 Cal.App.4th 826, 834 (2007); Stoneham v. Rushen, 137 Cal.App.3d 729, 733-34 (1982)). Therefore, venue also is proper in Alameda County pursuant to the special venue rule set forth in section 393.

C. This venue is proper pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 395.5.

Section 395.5 sets forth another special venue provision (emphasis added): "A corporation or association may be sued in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, *or where the obligation or liability arises*, or the breach occurs ..." Like section 393, and unlike section 395(a),

section 395.5 is not subject to exceptions "as otherwise provided by law." As Stanford's statutory liability to Plaintiff arose, in part, in Alameda County, (FAC ¶¶ 50, 299, 309; Young Decl. ¶ 3), venue is proper in Alameda County pursuant to section 395.5.

D. This venue is proper pursuant to Government Code section 12965(b).

Government Code section 12965(b) sets forth yet another special venue provision, providing a FEHA claim "may be brought in any county in the state in which the unlawful practice is alleged to have been committed, in the county in which the records relevant to the practice are maintained and administered, or in the county in which the aggrieved person would have worked or would have had access to the public accommodation but for the alleged unlawful practice, but if the defendant is not found within any of these counties, an action may be brought within the county of the defendant's residence or principal office." Like section 395.5, this provision is couched in permissive terms – "may" – not mandatory terms as in section 393 ("is the proper county").

Plaintiff alleges "records relevant to the practice" of Stanford's violating FEHA are maintained and administered in two locations in Alameda County. (FAC ¶ 51.) Stanford somehow contends that because other records identified in the FAC are in Alameda County, records relevant to the FEHA claims *ipso facto* must not exist. (Memo. at 11:4-14.) The existence of other records does not prove the non-existence of the FEHA records, and the undisputed evidence shows they are in Alameda County. (Young Decl. ¶ 2, 8, 18, 20, Exh. A; Sharma Decl. ¶ 6.)

Moreover, the first person who Plaintiff knows to have received the CEO's retaliatory email against her – and who informed Plaintiff of the email before she (Plaintiff) saw it – works for University HealthCare Alliance, a Stanford Health Care affiliate in Alameda County, and received the email at work in Alameda County. (Sharma Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. A; Young Decl. ¶ 18, Exh. A.) As a result, Plaintiff's most recent retaliation claim based on the CEO's email maligning her – arose first in Alameda County. (See DFEH Charge attached as Exhibit B to Young Decl.)

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E. Government Code section 12965(b) does not require this action to be tried in Santa Clara County.

The FEHA venue provision does not govern venue over an action involving 1. an individual co-defendant who is sued on non-FEHA claims; venue for this entire action is proper in Alameda as the county of defendant Flores's residence.

Stanford argues that "Defendant Flores' place of residence [is] irrelevant because, per *Brown*, the FEHA venue statute controls over the Code of Civil Procedure's general venue statute." (Memo. at 11:1-3.) This is Stanford's entire argument as to why venue is not proper where Ms. Flores resides. But Stanford's argument is absolutely wrong. Ample and applicable law demonstrates that venue is indeed proper in the county of Ms. Flores's residence.

Brown v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 477 (1984), does not establish what Stanford contends. Brown addressed whether "the FEHA venue statute applies to non-FEHA claims which arise from the same facts as a FEHA claim alleged in the same complaint." Id. at 484 (emphasis added). Brown acknowledged the limited reach of its holding: "In order for the FEHA venue provision to control, the non-FEHA claims must rest on similar factual allegations as the FEHA count." *Id.* at 487 & fn.9. Thus Brown held "that the special provisions of the FEHA venue statute control in cases involving FEHA claims joined with non-FEHA claims arising from the same facts." Id. at 487 (emphasis added). Brown did not hold that the FEHA venue statute controls where, as here, a plaintiff alleges non-FEHA claims arising from *different* facts. No statute, and no caselaw, so holds.

Brown is further inapposite because it did not address a case, as here, involving multiple defendants and non-FEHA claims arising from different facts alleged against a different defendant. In Brown, all defendants were sued as the plaintiffs' co-employers on the same facts as the FEHA claim. See id. at 480-81. Moreover, none of the Brown defendants resided in the county where suit was filed (see id. at 481, 482 fn.6), so whether residence could supply a basis for venue in that forum was not at issue. Again, no statute, and no caselaw, holds that the FEHA venue provision controls venue for an entire action where non-FEHA causes of action are alleged against a resident defendant.

No law so holds because such a concept is contrary to a well-established rule of venue. Whether or not certain claims against *one* defendant would otherwise be subject to a special venue rule – for example, to Code of Civil Procedure section 393 or 395.5, or Government Code section

12965(b) – venue always remains proper in the county of an individual co-defendant's residence against whom other claims are asserted. "Where an action is brought against both corporate and individual defendants, venue is proper for the action as a whole if it is correct as to any defendant. Venue is correct at the residence of any individual defendant, and in fact, is controlling, at the option of that defendant."

This rule properly reflects the relationship between principles of joinder and venue:

A number of causes of action may be joined in the same complaint. (Code Civ.Proc., § 427.10.) It is not necessary that each defendant be included in every cause of action. (Code Civ.Proc., § 379, subd. (b).) Where venue is proper in the county in which one of the defendants resides, as to one cause of action, venue is proper in that county as to all properly joined causes of action and defendants. Plaintiff's selection of venue may not be defeated even if all the defendants concur in a motion to change venue to a county in which another defendant resides. [Citation.] This rule is applicable even if some of the causes of action name only nonresidents, although a resident defendant is named in others.

Tutor-Saliba-Perini Joint Venture v. Superior Court, 233 Cal.App.3d 736, 742 (1991) (emphasis added); see Dillman v. Superior Court, 205 Cal.App.2d 769, 772 (1962) ("The general rules governing joinder of defendants and the effect of such joinder on venue apply whether the defendants are individuals or corporations ... if a cause of action is stated against both, and the joinder is in conformity with the statutes, the plaintiff may fix the venue at the residence of either the individual or the corporation"); Dennis v. Overholtzer, 143 Cal.App.2d 606, 607 (1956) ("where a defendant is properly named in one cause of action and he is a resident of the county where the action is brought, the venue for the entire action is in that county").²

Several opinions illustrate this legal principle's application in cases involving a special venue provision (*i.e.*, an exception to section 395(a); see *infra*) that would otherwise apply. In *Cubic Corp* v. *Superior Court*, 186 Cal.App.3d 622, 624-25 (1986), the plaintiff asserted causes of action sounding in contract and tort against two corporations, and asserted the one or both of the torts

² The other defendants' joinder in the motion is irrelevant. *See La Mirada*, 249 Cal.App.2d at 43. But it is curious that Defendant Flores has joined in a motion which, if granted, would only cause inconvenience to her; her rationale can only be that proceeding in Santa Clara County, with its strong pro-Stanford bias in the community jury pool, would make the inconvenience worth it.

against two individuals. Despite that venue was otherwise proper in Alameda County as to all causes of action involving the corporate defendants pursuant to section 395.5, the Court of Appeal ordered the action transferred to San Diego County, because venue there was proper under section 395 as to one of the individuals. In La Mirada Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 249 Cal.App.2d 39, 41 (1967), the corporate defendant and the individual defendants moved for a change of venue, but they did not identify the residence of the individual defendants. While noting that the rule now codified in section 395.5 "specifies the proper county for commencement of actions against a corporation," the court stated, "Where a corporation and individuals ... are joined as defendants the action is commenced properly in the county in which any of the defendants is a resident." Id. (emphasis added). The La Mirada court concluded that the motion to transfer venue could not be granted in the absence of a showing that no individual defendant resided in the county where the plaintiff filed suit. La Mirada, 249 Cal.App.2d at 42-44. Likewise, in Shida, supra, 185 Cal.App.2d at 444, 447-48, after observing that "the rights of the corporate defendant ... are governed by" the special venue rule now codified in section 395.5, the court observed that it remained the burden of the corporate defendant seeking a change of venue to prove "that no defendant was a resident of the County of Los Angeles ... in which venue was originally laid by the filing of plaintiff's complaint." *Id.* at 447-48.

2. The FEHA venue provision does not govern venue over an action involving claims, as here, to which other special venue provisions apply.

Stanford argues that "the recovery of a 'penalty or forfeiture' for Plaintiff's unpaid wages and reimbursement of business expenses . . . [is] irrelevant because, per *Brown*, the FEHA venue statute controls over the Code of Civil Procedure's general venue statute." (Memo. at 10:28-11:3.) Stanford's argument is patently meritless, and it intentionally misrepresents the law.

The "general venue statute" is, and is only, Code of Civil Procedure section 395(a). *Fontaine*, 175 Cal.App.4th at 837; *Brown*, 37 Cal.3d at 483. Stanford's argument is meritless because Plaintiff's claim for recovery of statutory penalties against Stanford is governed by the special venue rule set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 393, not the general venue rule set forth in section 395. The *Brown* case in no way addressed the propriety of venue under section 393, or the relationship between the FEHA venue provision any venue provision other than section 395. *See*

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Brown, 37 Cal.3d at 482-87. And Stanford knows its argument is meritless – which means it is frivolous. Brown expressly acknowledged that section 393 is a "specific venue provision" that has been held to be an exception to section 395, just like Brown found section 12965(b) to be. See id. at 484 (citing Tharp v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.3d 496 (1982)). Moreover, in correspondence sent before filing this motion, which Stanford has filed (Ng Decl., Exh. 1), Stanford's attorney referred to "the general venue rule" and cited section 395, not any other statute. Realizing that its position has no support in the law, Stanford has instead elected to try to mislead the Court about what the law is.

Neither Brown, nor any other caselaw or statute, addresses whether one special venue provision controls over any other, where more than one such venue provision is applicable to any action or any cause of action; nor does *Brown* or any other law directly address the circumstances under which one may or may not control over another. We say "directly" because the law of "plaintiff's choice," supra, should indeed apply: pursuant to that law, where more than one venue such provision is applicable, venue should be proper pursuant to any of them. All three statutes allow a plaintiff to sue where a cause of action arises, and sections 395.5 and 12965(b) are equally intended to broaden plaintiffs' options for venue. See Brown, 37 Cal.3d at 486 ("Section 12965, subdivision (b) affords a wide choice of venue to persons who bring actions under the FEHA. This choice maximizes the ability of persons aggrieved by employment discrimination to seek relief from the courts, and it facilitates the enforcement of the FEHA"); Mission Imports, 31 Cal.3d at 928 ("The purpose of the section [395.5] is to permit a wider choice of venue in suits against a corporation than is permitted in suits against an individual defendant"); Smith, 212 Cal.App.2d at 752-53. There is no reason in law, fact, or policy why section 12965(b) does or should supersede section 393 or section 395.5 in this case. As for section 393, as is noted *supra*, that statute is couched in mandatory terms, whereas section 12965(b) is couched in permissive terms. There is simply no reason why the permissive should supersede the mandatory.

F. Stanford's "mixed action" argument is equally meritless.

As shown above, venue over this entire action is proper in Alameda County. The "mixed action" rule Stanford attempts to invoke therefore does not apply. The "mixed action" rule serves only to support the point Plaintiff made *supra*: that venue over this action in its entirety is proper in

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the county of defendant Flores's residence. This is because, as indicated in *Brown* – and as overlooked by Stanford – "the mixed action rule recognizes a preference for trial in the county of *a defendant's* residence," and it only arises in cases where an action is commenced in a "non-residence county," *i.e.*, where no defendant resides; where that rule applies, "the entire action will be transferred on motion to the county of *a defendant's* residence, because the entire action, being a mixed action, is not within any statutory exception authorizing venue *elsewhere than in a residence county.*" *Brown*, 37 Cal.3d at 488 & fn.10 (emphasis added).

III. The Court should deny Stanford's motion to transfer venue based on the convenience of witnesses and the "ends of justice."

"The burden rests on one who seeks a change of venue under [Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 397] to prove that *both* the convenience of witnesses *and* ends of justice will be promoted thereby, and this he must do through *affidavits that contain more than generalities and conclusions." Hamilton v. Superior Court*, 37 Cal.App.3d 418, 424 (1974) (emphasis added). "The last mentioned statute contains conjunctive conditions both of which must occur, and before the motion can be granted there must be some showing not only that the convenience of witnesses but that the ends of justice will be promoted by the change." *Pearson v. Superior Court*, 199 Cal.App.2d 69, 77 (1962); *Corfee*, 202 Cal.App.2d at 479. "The burden of making a sufficient showing is on the moving party, and he must stand upon the strength of his showing rather than upon the weakness, if any, of the opposition." *Union Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court*, 259 Cal.App.2d 23, 28 (1968).

A. The convenience of witnesses and ends of justice will not be promoted by a change of venue, but rather would be thwarted.

"The affidavit or affidavits supporting [this] motion 'must set forth the names of the witnesses, the nature of the testimony expected from each, and the reasons why the attendance of each would be inconvenient'. . . . '[I]t must appear that the witnesses involved will testify as to relevant and material facts.' [Citations.] Convenience of witnesses is shown by the fact that the residence of all the witnesses is in the county to which the transfer of the cause is requested."

Pearson, 199 Cal.App.2d at 77 (emphasis added).

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"A mere numerical majority of witnesses on one side or the other does not necessarily determine the merits of the motion." *Wirta v. Vergona*, 155 Cal.App.2d 29, 32 (1957); *Wood v. Silvers*, 35 Cal.App.2d 604, 607 (1939) ("It is apparent that in determining the convenience of witnesses the evidence of one or more of them may be more important in deciding the issues involved than a greater number of other witnesses"). That is why the *nature* and *materiality* of the testimony expected from each witness must be demonstrated in the affidavits. *See Pearson*, 199 Cal.App.2d at 77; *Dillman*, 205 Cal.App.2d at 773 (the nature of the expected testimony from each witness must be shown because "it must be shown that their proposed testimony is admissible, relevant and material to some issue in the case"). Demonstrating this nature and materiality generally requires that not only the *subjects* but also the *substance* of a witness' testimony be identified, as well as whether the testimony is expected to be *favorable* or *unfavorable* to the party purporting to claim a change of venue will promote that witness' convenience. *See Edwards v. Pierson*, 156 Cal.App.2d 72, 75 (1957); *Chaffin Constr.*, 155 Cal.App.2d at 663.

Furthermore, "Ordinarily only convenience to third-party disinterested witnesses will be considered. Convenience to the parties or their agents or employees may not be considered." *Corfee v. Southern Cal. Edison Co.*, 202 Cal.App.2d 473, 478 (1962); *Mettler v. Hedley*, 170 Cal.App.2d 277, 282 (1959); *Dillman*, 205 Cal.App.2d at 773-74 (concluding based on these rules, "Since the only witnesses mentioned in these declarations are Mr. Caldwell, a party to the litigation, and Mr. Dendinger, his employee, there is no basis whatever therein for change of venue grounded upon convenience of witnesses").

Stanford has wholly failed to satisfy this burden: the Harris declaration fails to show where any witness resides, that attendance at trial in Alameda County would be inconvenient for any witness, or why. It further fails to show the expected substance of any witness' testimony, or whether it would be favorable to Stanford. Furthermore, it fails to identify any witness who is not a party to this lawsuit or an employee of Stanford who would be inconvenienced.

Moreover, Stanford has made no showing that the ends of justice would be served by transferring the case to Santa Clara, and Plaintiff's has presented admissible evidence of the opposite – that the ends of justice would be hopelessly thwarted by such a transfer following the CEO's

retaliatory email to 1000's of its Santa Clara-resident employees proclaiming Plaintiff a liar. This inexplicable act of retaliation could serve only two purposes: (1) to precondition thousands of potential jurors in Santa Clara County, made up of Stanford employees, their families and friends, to perceive Plaintiff as dishonest and a liar; and (2) to make Plaintiff's continued employment at Stanford even more difficult through isolation, shunning and distrust.

Plaintiff further submits declarations herewith showing that her witnesses, including key witnesses – all of whom are Alameda County residents – would be inconvenienced by a trial in Santa Clara County. "If the affidavits of plaintiff in opposition to the motion for change of venue show that his witnesses also will be inconvenienced by the change to another county as is requested by defendant," the Court may properly deny the motion. *Hecker v. Ross*, 183 Cal.App.2d 30, 33 (1960). Among other grounds of inconvenience set forth in Plaintiff's evidence are the *residences* of her witnesses, from which fact alone inconvenience resulting from a transfer of venue can be inferred. *See Corfee*, 202 Cal.App.2d at 478. *See* Young, Sharma, Morales, and Geegan Declarations, *generally*. Thus, even if any balancing of conveniences were appropriate, the Court should deny the motion.

B. The ends of justice will not be promoted by a change of venue, and Stanford has not satisfied its burden to show that they would.

"The affidavit or affidavits supporting [this] motion . . . must set forth facts from which the conclusion can be drawn that the ends of justice will be promoted. . . . A conclusion that the ends of justice are promoted can be drawn from the fact that by moving the trial closer to *the residence* of the witnesses, delay and expense in court proceedings are avoided and savings in the witnesses' time and expense are affected." *Pearson*, 199 Cal.App.2d at 77 (emphasis added); *Flanagan v. Flanagan*, 175 Cal.App.2d 641, 646 (1959). Here, Stanford's evidence is woefully deficient, as it fails to identify where any of the witnesses resides. The only remotely relevant fact Stanford proffers any evidence of is the location of its books and records: "such facts may be considered on the question whether the ends of justice will be served by making more expeditious the production of records." *Minatta v. Crook*, 166 Cal.App.2d 750, 756 (1959). However, the evidence shows that records relevant to Plaintiff's claims also are maintained in two locations in Alameda County, including by a

non-party witness. Further, unlike when the *Minatta* opinion issued in 1959, documents are likely to be produced electronically in this action, and Alameda County is not so far that Stanford's production of records there is likely to be delayed or more costly in any event.

Stanford's argument is similarly deficient: it contends, without any evidentiary support, that the ends of justice will be served because its employees work for it and therefore "are more easily able to serve the needs of the hospital's patients and families" if the trial were held closer to where they work. (Memo. at 15:6-10.) Three problems with this are (1) Stanford does not address the residence of any witness, (2) Stanford really is arguing its *own* convenience, not the convenience of any witness, and the administration and scheduling of its employees is irrelevant to whether the "ends of justice" would be served by a transfer of this lawsuit, and (3) Stanford does not proffer any evidence to show when its employees do or do not work, or the flexibility they have in their schedules, or that Stanford somehow cannot manage its own employees in order to ensure coverage at its hospital or administrative centers. Indeed, as Plaintiff is well aware, Stanford employees – including its surgeons and oncologists – have scheduled days off. (Young Decl. ¶ 16.) Moreover, the distance at issue is merely 16 miles, as a quick Google search shows that it is 33 miles from Palo Alto to Oakland versus 17 miles from Palo Alto to San Jose. (RJN, Exh. B.)

Plaintiff's evidence also shows that the "ends of justice" would be thwarted a transfer to Santa Clara County given the CEO's massive email distribution to thousands of Santa Clara County potential jurors accusing Plaintiff of untrustworthiness and dishonesty and calling her claims "grossly exaggerated." (See Young Decl. ¶ 18, Ex A; Hutner Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. C; Sharma Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. A.) The Stanford defendants collectively are the largest employer of any kind in Santa Clara County. (RJN, Exh. C.) CEO Entwistle emailed all employees of the Stanford Defendants, including those of its affiliates – which now appear to number more than 20,000 persons in Santa Clara County (RJN, Exh. C) – and based on Stanford's contentions most of those employees must be employed in, and may very well reside in, Santa Clara County. By overtly poisoning opinion against Plaintiff among a vast percentage of potential jurors among the Santa Clara County jury pool, Stanford confuses "ending justice" with the very different goal of serving "the ends of justice."

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IV. The Court should award Plaintiff expenses in opposing the motion.

Plaintiff chose venue in good faith and based on the facts and law. Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court deny Stanford's motion and request for sanctions, *see* Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 396b(b), and instead order it (or its attorneys) to pay to Plaintiff \$23,250.00 for her reasonable expenses incurred in resisting the motion. (*See* Hutner Decl., Ex. B and ¶¶ 12-14.) The evidence shows (1) Stanford's demand to stipulate to Santa Clara County was not "reasonably made," and (2) it did not make its motion "in good faith given the facts and law" it "knew or should have known" – the two relevant factors under § 396b(b). Stanford's motion is devoid of legal and evidentiary support; it has ignored and misrepresented the law; and it has needlessly put Plaintiff and her counsel to great burden and cost to oppose. Stanford has proceeded in bad faith and it can and should be held responsible for the resulting costs.

V. Conclusion.

As Stanford's motion is wholly without merit, Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to deny the motion and to further order Stanford and/or its counsel to pay to Plaintiff \$23,250.00 for her reasonable expenses incurred in resisting the motion.

Dated: November 27, 2017

VILLARREAL HUTNER PC

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